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1. Introduction 
1.1 Retail innovation and efficiency 
1. Retailing is central to economic activity, as the source from which consumers buy the goods they 
need and the route by which producers distribute their goods to these consumers.  The sector’s economic 
importance has grown over time as disposable incomes have risen and consumers’ appetite to spend more 
on goods has grown.  This increased demand has spurred considerable innovation and structural change in 
the sector, as new forms of retailers have emerged.  In particular, the retail landscape has been transformed 
in many countries by the rise of large format “big-box” stores and hypermarkets in retail parks and 
locations away from town and city centres and the increasing domination of large multiple chain-stores 
promoting a common retail brand identity as a challenge to traditional, independent retailers.  At the same 
time, improved information technology and sophisticated logistics systems allowing for continuous 
replenishment and re-stocking have provided the opportunity to revolutionise efficiency in the industry 
with quick-response and just-in-time systems promoting much greater integration and connectivity across 
supply chains.  Certainly, different countries and regions have proceeded at different paces in terms of 
seeing such changes take place, but the spread and diffusion of these innovations and efficiency 
enhancements is taking place on a global scale.  
1.2 Retailing in the public eye 
2. Perhaps nowhere more has the profound changes in retailing been witnessed than in the retail 
grocery sector, where large format supermarkets and hypermarkets have emerged in most countries to 
provide a “one-stop-shopping” service catering for all (or most of) consumers’ food purchasing needs as 
well as increasingly providing wide selections of non-food items, and as a consequence taking an increase 
share of consumers’ total expenditure on retail goods. Not surprisingly then, for consumers, the levels of 
prices, choice, quality and innovation they face, in respect of the goods and service provided by these 
supermarkets and the other retailers they rely upon for most of their other retail purchases, take on 
considerable importance.  Weak or ineffective competition in the sector has the potential for causing 
significant consumer welfare loss in absolute terms.  As such, this is then a sector constantly in the public 
eye and in which any industry-led developments or regulation-led impediments that might lessen 
competition or consumer welfare should be subject to close scrutiny.  
1.3 Emerging oligopoly structures 
3. In grocery retailing, along with many other areas of retailing, chain-store retailers (known as 
“multiples”) operating a number of stores under a common retailer banner have become increasingly 
prevalent and have grown at the expense of a diminishing, if still important, independent retail sector.  As 
the retail sector has consolidated then typically a limited number of major retailers have emerged to lead if 
not dominate key retail segments. Hence, over time, oligopoly structures have then emerged in retailing to 
replace once highly fragmented structures.  In the process, these retailers may not just have gained seller 
power over consumers but also buyer power over suppliers.  This means that any competitive assessment 
of retailing will need to consider how these two forms of power can interact and how they may 
individually and in combination affect competition at successive stages of supply chains.  It is this 
relationship between retailer buyer and seller power that is the main theme of this paper in seeking to 
understand the dynamic process through which retailing is going and the direction it is heading and how it 
might be affected by regulation.  This dynamic aspect is important because of the rapid pace through which 
retailing can develop and how competition policy and regulatory decisions today can affect the path the 
industry will be taking and how this will affect market outcomes and the economic welfare of consumers 
and the firms involved in all stages of supply chains. 
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1.4 Paper outline and organisation 
4. As with any short summary paper, it is not possible to cover in detail the myriad of competition 
issues thrown up by the rapid developments taking place in retailing in terms of the changing market structure 
and conduct of the firms involved.  Instead, this paper will begin by considering how retail developments are 
taking place in Latin America and the Caribbean and how they might shape the future of competition in the 
retail sector. This will provide important context for addressing competition assessment in retailing, whether 
it is the context of a merger inquiry, an inquest about specific actions or forms of behaviour, or a full-blown 
market investigation, and also consider how competition can be affected by regulation.  
1.5 Key questions to be addressed 
5. As a way of organising the material for this paper, the paper proceeds by addressing five 
questions, building on each other to examine different aspects of structural and regulatory issues in 
retailing:  
1. What is the composition and structure of retailing in Latin America and the Caribbean? 
2. How should retail markets be defined? 
3. Is higher retail concentration inevitable and is that good or bad for consumers? 
4. Is retailer dominance over suppliers good or bad for economic welfare? 
5. How can regulation work to promote rather than impede effective competition in retailing? 
6. In addressing these questions, insights and details will be drawn from across a variety of retail 
sectors, but the key insights will relate to the retail grocery sector, because it both the largest and therefore 
most economically important retail segment and also it is the one that has received the greatest attention 
from competition authorities so there is now a growing body of case insights and lessons to draw on. 
7. Necessarily, the discussion will be limited to the key points, but there will be suggestions for 
further reading for both the relevant academic literature as well as the different market studies, 
commentaries and guidance that has emerged from competition authorities and international agencies in 
the last few years to help competition authority officials undertake economic assessments applied to the 
retail sector.
1
  
  
                                                     
1 
 In particular, Kobel et al. (2015) provide a detailed multi-country perspective on antitrust issues in the 
groceries sector, with separate chapters covering individual countries, including a chapter on Brazil, and a 
useful introduction chapter to provide a thorough overview across all the countries studied.  In addition, in 
respect of Latin America, Basker and Noel (2013) provide a very useful summary of the key developments 
taking place in grocery retailing and the relevant antitrust and competition assessment issues.  
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2.  What is the composition and structure of retailing in Latin America and the Caribbean? 
2.1 Retail diversity 
8. As a large continent and major world region, made up of many differently sized countries at 
different stages economic development, it is not surprising that the structure and character of retailing is 
diverse across Latin America and the Caribbean.  In some countries, modern grocery distribution has 
advanced and commands a large share of the retail grocery trade.  Yet, in most countries in the region, the 
traditional, independent retail sector is still prevalent and accounts for a large share of retail sales.  
2.2 Retail sales at country level 
9. To give some indication of the diversity in retailing across the continent, Table 1 provides details 
of the retail sales at country level in respect of all formats of retailers, compared with sales for food 
retailers in general along with that designated as being through modern grocery distributors.
2
  As the sizes 
of the populations for each of these countries vary very considerably across the region, the table also 
provides the same sales figures expressed on a per capita basis (measured in US Dollars) to allow for 
comparisons to be made in terms of consumer spend from one country to another. However, the figures are 
estimated values and might be dependent on the manner in which sales are defined and recorded in 
different countries, and so making reliable inter-country comparisons difficult. Nonetheless, the table does 
indicate that for many countries, modern grocery distribution still only accounts for around one-quarter to 
one-third of all retail sales and to about half to two-thirds of food retailer sales, but with significant 
variation around these averages across the countries listed in the table.  Furthermore, it is noticeable that 
the Caribbean countries on average have higher per capita sales, especially through modern grocery 
distribution, than on average for continental Latin American countries, which is strongly reflected in 
differences of GDP per capita (as shown in the last column) but could also be attributable to different 
consumer spending patterns on food and also the availability and diffusion of modern grocery distributors 
in each of the listed countries.
3
 
 
  
                                                     
2  Planet Retail, as the source of the data for Table 1, defines MGD sales to cover sales (including VAT or 
sales tax) for modern grocery distribution retailers and wholesale enterprises. In respect of grocery sales, 
these relate to total sales of edible grocery, household and pet care, health and beauty and foodservice. 
3 
 The correlation coefficient between GDP per capita and MGD total sales and grocery sales per capita 
across all these countries is respectively 0.976 and 0.977, while the correlation coefficient between GDP 
per capita and total and food retail format sales per capita is respectively 0.955 and 0.841, indicating that 
modern grocery distribution sales and total retail format sales are very closely aligned with GDP but that 
there is slightly more variation when it comes to food retail format sales and GDP. 
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Table 1. Retail Sales in Latin America and the Caribbean 
Country Total retail 
format 
national 
sales 
(US $m) 
Food retail 
format 
national 
sales 
(US $m) 
MGD total 
sales 
(US $m) 
MGD 
grocery 
sales 
(US $m) 
Total 
retail 
format 
sales 
/capita 
(US$) 
Food 
retail 
format 
sales/cap
ita (US$) 
MGD 
total 
sales/cap
ita (US$) 
MGD 
grocery 
sales/cap
ita (US$) 
GDP per 
capita 
(US$) 
Antigua and Barbuda 311 139 137 106 3,494 1,560 1,538 1,190 14,462 
Argentina 121,383 50,564 31,678 25,474 2,861 1,192 747 600 13,115 
Aruba 600 225 307 226 8,098 3,030 4,138 3,049 49,876 
Bahamas 2,131 809 667 579 5,854 2,222 1,831 1,590 25,350 
Barbados 1,367 570 641 487 4,883 2,037 2,288 1,739 15,866 
Belize 612 315 225 178 1,682 865 617 490 4,920 
Bermuda 1,794 538 1,034 714 26,113 7,834 15,045 10,390 145,548 
Bolivia 14,243 8,506 2,369 2,112 1,243 742 207 184 3,110 
Brazil 487,882 245,975 213,910 173,685 2,386 1,203 1,046 850 9,349 
Chile 87,293 41,201 44,460 30,637 4,848 2,288 2,469 1,702 13,737 
Colombia 97,431 47,459 23,020 18,879 2,021 984 478 392 6,504 
Costa Rica 16,579 7,844 5,073 4,205 3,428 1,622 1,049 869 11,562 
Cuba 30,570 17,542 10,100 8,017 2,631 1,510 869 690 8,471 
Dominica 167 82 65 52 2,349 1,159 918 729 7,560 
Dominican Republic 30,178 15,569 10,688 8,036 2,796 1,443 990 745 6,187 
Ecuador 40,282 24,027 11,793 9,361 2,474 1,476 724 575 6,306 
El Salvador 12,278 6,468 4,153 3,326 1,925 1,014 651 522 4,101 
French Guiana 940 419 396 305 4,102 1,831 1,728 1,330 20,894 
Grenada 344 163 134 105 3,242 1,539 1,268 990 8,359 
Guadeloupe 3,030 1,257 1,012 869 6,257 2,596 2,090 1,794 26,039 
Guatemala 30,539 16,830 9,437 7,482 1,877 1,035 580 460 4,104 
Guyana 1,813 1,021 526 418 2,261 1,273 656 521 4,307 
Haiti 6,638 4,388 1,327 1,081 626 414 125 102 865 
Honduras 10,064 5,984 1,863 1,615 1,193 710 221 192 2,443 
Jamaica 6,061 2,916 2,229 1,698 2,154 1,036 792 603 5,148 
Martinique 3,240 1,327 2,439 1,762 7,054 2,890 5,311 3,836 29,949 
Mexico 382,173 178,138 201,490 154,787 3,156 1,471 1,664 1,278 9,651 
Netherlands Antilles 1,101 465 500 380 4,661 1,969 2,119 1,610 21,100 
Nicaragua 4,867 3,042 1,210 973 772 483 192 154 2,025 
Panama 11,222 5,618 3,207 2,793 2,801 1,402 800 697 11,852 
Paraguay 11,484 6,578 3,135 2,490 1,637 937 447 355 4,112 
Peru 70,779 41,162 21,539 17,210 2,218 1,290 675 539 6,117 
Puerto Rico 26,782 12,102 10,578 8,257 6,628 2,995 2,618 2,044 25,815 
St Kitts and Nevis 285 134 128 97 4,677 2,191 2,100 1,586 14,648 
St Lucia 437 224 168 133 2,558 1,312 983 777 8,284 
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines 
343 177 132 103 3,115 1,607 1,201 938 6,926 
Suriname 1,356 878 459 358 2,430 1,573 823 642 10,133 
Trinidad and Tobago 8,598 4,252 3,361 2,566 6,331 3,131 2,475 1,890 22,154 
Uruguay 21,737 9,697 6,564 5,337 6,363 2,839 1,921 1,562 15,763 
Venezuela 367,725 194,568 61,118 49,935 11,888 6,290 1,976 1,614 23,870 
TOTAL 1,916,659 959,173 693,272 546,828 - - - - - 
AVERAGE 
(unweighted) 
47,916 23,979 17,332 13,671 4,177 1,875 1,709 1,296 15,765 
Source: Author’s analysis based on data sourced from Planet Retail (http://www.planetretail.net) 
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2.3 Retail channels’ share of trade 
10. In terms of how sales vary across the retail channels in Latin America compared to other world 
regions, Table 2 provides a breakdown by the key retail channels for retail grocery sales in percentage 
terms.
4
  Here, it is noticeable that traditional retailing still maintains a substantial share of sales, holding 
almost a quarter of sales which matches the combined share held by large supermarkets and hypermarkets.  
Moreover, with bars and kiosks also being important, in holding 11% of sales, it is evident that small 
outlets predominate in the region.  All five world regions illustrated in the table display differences, but the 
contrast with the domination of large format stores in North America and Europe is very distinct from 
Latin America, and different again from the Africa/Middle East and Asia-Pacific regions.  
Table 2. Percent Share of Trade by Retail Channel for World Regions 
 Latin America North 
America 
Europe Asia/Pacific Africa & Middle 
East 
Large Supermarket 13 41 25 11 33 
Hypermarket 11 32 24 18 1 
Traditional 24 - 8 38 42 
Convenience 1 20 6 7 4 
Small Supermarket 18 - 17 12 5 
Drug Store 9 7 4 5 6 
Hard Discounter - 1 11 - - 
Bar 5 - - 2 4 
Kiosk 6 - 1 1 1 
Specialty - - 1 - - 
Other 4 - 4 7 4 
Source: Based on information adapted from Nielsen (2015) 
2.4 Leading grocery retailers in Latin America 
11. On a continental basis, the retail grocery sector remains quite fragmented, even though at the 
country level market concentration can be significant.  At present, the leading grocery retailers only 
command a small share of the total grocery sales across the entire region when put into the context that 
total food retail sales are close to US$960 billion and modern grocery distribution sales are around US$690 
billion (based on the totals given in Table 1).  However, as Table 3 shows in terms of the leading grocery 
retailers in Latin America, five retailers are now generating annual sales in excess of $15bn across all their 
different store formats and seem set to grow quickly over the next few years.   For all twenty retailers, their 
sales are forecast to rise from $225bn to $300bn over that period, and currently they appear to be near to 
accounting for a quarter of all food retail format sales and a third of all modern grocery distribution sales 
across the entire region.  
 
 
 
                                                     
4 
 Latin America sales in Table 2 relate to sales in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Mexico, Peru and 
Venezuela.  
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Table 3. Top 20 Grocery Retailers in Latin America 
Rank Retail Company  
(nationality) 
Company Outlets 
2013 (estimates) 
Banner Sales 2013 
(estimates) (US$m) 
Banner Sales 2018 
(forecast) (US$m) 
1 Walmart (USA) 4,284 60,428 78,502 
2 Casino (France) 2,395 37,687 54,224 
3 Cencosud (Chile) 1,325 24,403 28,256 
4 Carrefour (France) 763 21,127 28,566 
5 Falabella (Chile) 531 15,521 22,655 
6 Soriana (Mexico) 815 8,648 10,432 
7 OXXO (Mexico) 12,528 7,762 11,973 
8 Lojas Americanas (Brazil) 856 7,173 12,246 
9 SHV Makro (Germany) 186 6,838 9,246 
10 SMU (Chile) 737 5,288 4,616 
11 Chedraui (Mexico) 211 4,252 5,414 
12 Dia (Spain) 1,310 3,919 6,877 
13 Comercial Mexicana (Mexico) 268 3,909 5,078 
14 Costco (USA) 37 3,569 4,314 
15 Coto (Argentina) 117 3,384 2,729 
16 Safeway (USA) 206 2,618 3,273 
17 La Anónima (Argentina) 141 2,410 2,000 
18 Olimpica (Columbia) 334 2,403 3,108 
19 PriceSmart (USA) 30 2,287 3,568 
20 Corporación Favorita (Ecuador) 145 1,888 2,788 
 Top 20 TOTAL  27,219 225,514 299,865 
Source: Based on information adapted from Planet Retail (2014) and http://www.planetretail.net 
2.5 Range of leading retail banners 
12. Taking a broader look at all retail sectors, it is evident that a mix of domestic and international 
retailers have been growing sales in different sub-sectors of retailing, and related retail service areas 
including food service and fast food chains.  To give an indication of this broad mix, Table 4 provides a 
ranking of the top 50 retail banners (i.e. retail names) covering the entire region of Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  This shows the total sales for the retail banner as well as the banner’s grocery sales (if 
appropriate to that retailer).  In addition, the share of sales for each of these banners is shown (expressed in 
percentage terms from all 441 retail banners recorded by Planet Retail as having sales for this world 
region).  Spanning the entire region, it is not uncommon for the larger international retailers to use different 
retail banners for different countries or combinations of countries, as well as for different retail formats.
5
  
Accordingly, the influence of these retailers extends beyond individual banners and it is the combination of 
the banners that represents the true scale of the retailer and the potential to exert market power over both 
consumers, through the choice of different outlets available, and suppliers, through the alternative routes to 
final consumers for their goods. 
 
                                                     
5 
  For instance, in reference to the different leading retailers listed in Table 3, Walmart has operated with 16 
distinct banners and formats, Carrefour with 7, Casino with 19, Cencosud with 10, Soriana with 5, OXXO with 
2 and SHV Makro with 3 across Latin America – see details in Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2012). 
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Table 4. Top 50 Retail Banners in Latin America and the Caribbean (2015f) 
Rank by 
Total 
Banner 
Sales 
Retail Banner Total 
Banner 
Sales 
(US$m) 
MGD 
grocery 
banner 
sales 
(US$m) 
Share of 
Total 
Banner 
Sales % 
Share of 
MGD 
Grocery 
Banner 
Sales % 
MGD total 
market 
share % 
1 Walmart Supercenter 14,682 10,183 4.69 6.22 2.12 
2 Carrefour 8,870 6,159 2.83 3.76 1.26 
3 Sam's Club 8,576 4,859 2.74 2.97 1.24 
4 Atacadão 8,013 5,713 2.56 3.49 1.16 
5 Bodega Aurrerá 7,869 2,556 2.51 1.56 1.13 
6 OXXO 7,516 7,115 2.40 4.35 1.08 
7 Coppel 7,004 - 2.24 - - 
8 Casas Bahia 6,886 - 2.20 - - 
9 Makro 5,961 4,229 1.90 2.58 0.86 
10 Jumbo 5,063 3,445 1.62 2.10 0.73 
11 Liverpool 4,954 - 1.58 - - 
12 Extra Hipermercado 4,801 3,685 1.53 2.25 0.69 
13 Dia 4,452 4,022 1.42 2.46 0.64 
14 Soriana Hiper 4,286 2,992 1.37 1.83 0.62 
15 Homecenter Sodimac 4,250 - 1.36 - - 
16 McDonald's 4,226 - 1.35 - - 
17 Costco 4,213 2,431 1.35 1.48 0.61 
18 Lider 4,118 2,622 1.32 1.60 0.59 
19 O Boticário 4,009 3,739 1.28 2.28 0.58 
20 Falabella 3,865 - 1.23 - - 
21 Assai 3,659 2,609 1.17 1.59 0.53 
22 Disco 3,645 3,312 1.16 2.02 0.53 
23 B2W Digital 3,603 - 1.15 - - 
24 Chedraui 3,380 2,360 1.08 1.44 0.49 
25 Exito 3,348 2,103 1.07 1.28 0.48 
26 Magazine Luiza 3,330 - 1.06 - - 
27 Casa Ley 2,968 2,121 0.95 1.30 0.43 
28 PriceSmart 2,962 1,646 0.95 1.01 0.43 
29 Cnova 2,862 - 0.91 - - 
30 Lojas Americanas 2,807 1,022 0.90 0.62 0.40 
31 Home Depot (The) 2,800 - 0.89 - - 
32 Pernambucanas 2,668 - 0.85 - - 
33 Santa Isabel 2,530 2,316 0.81 1.41 0.36 
34 Drogasil 2,488 2,258 0.79 1.38 0.36 
35 Unimarc 2,484 2,483 0.79 1.52 0.36 
36 SuperFarmacia 2,452 2,079 0.78 1.27 0.35 
37 Easy 2,403 - 0.77 - - 
38 Pão de Açúcar 2,372 2,200 0.76 1.34 0.34 
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Rank by 
Total 
Banner 
Sales 
Retail Banner Total 
Banner 
Sales 
(US$m) 
MGD 
grocery 
banner 
sales 
(US$m) 
Share of 
Total 
Banner 
Sales % 
Share of 
MGD 
Grocery 
Banner Sales 
% 
MGD total 
market 
share % 
39 Tottus 2,325 1,705 0.74 1.04 0.34 
40 Subway 2,015 - 0.64 - - 
41 Fast Shop 1,950 - 0.62 - - 
42 Bodega Aurrera Express 1,945 1,757 0.62 1.07 0.28 
43 Ponto Frio 1,909 - 0.61 - - 
44 Sears 1,869 - 0.60 - - 
45 La Anónima 1,833 1,661 0.59 1.01 0.26 
46 H-E-B 1,820 1,271 0.58 0.78 0.26 
47 Super Central Madeirense 1,697 1,573 0.54 0.96 0.24 
48 Metro 1,648 1,399 0.53 0.85 0.24 
49 Extra Supermercado 1,643 1,524 0.53 0.93 0.24 
50 Paris 1,635 - 0.52 - - 
 SECTOR TOTAL (out of 441 banners) 312,983 163,744    
Source: Author’s analysis based on 2015 forecast sales data from Planet Retail (http://www.planetretail.net) 
2.6 Leading retailers in individual countries 
13. At the individual country level with this continent and region there appears to be significant 
variation in respect of the mix of leading retailers and also the market shares that they hold.  In some Latin 
American countries, the leading retailers seem to hold quite substantial shares while in other countries the 
retail sector appears to be highly fragmented and the leading retailers only hold small market shares.  To give 
some indication of the extent of this variation, Table 5 provides a list of the leading grocery retailers and 
distributors for a selected range of different countries across the region.
6
   The selection of countries is based 
on available retailer data from Planet Retail and the sales and other figures relate to their forecasts for 2015.  
In some of these countries, the leading retailers’ market shares appear to be very small (e.g. in Brazil, 
Dominican Republic and Peru where even the top retailer is shown as holding less than a 4% grocery market 
share).  In some other countries, notably Costa Rica but also to a less extreme in Columbia, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, there is one leading retailer that appears to have a sizeable market share 
advantage over its rivals.   However, in the other countries, notably Argentina, Chile, Puerto Rico and 
Uruguay, there is a mix of leading retailers where the market share differences are more limited or there are at 
least a leading pair of retailers that are close in market share terms with each vying for the top position.  
14. A further feature, which is very evident from Table 5, is the range of average of store sizes both 
across the leading retailers as well as across the different countries. In some cases, the average outlet sizes 
represent very large hypermarket or warehouse club proportions (exceeding 5,000 m
2
 of sales area), and in 
                                                     
6 
  The list of retailers, all the figures and the rankings are drawn from country level data provided by Planet 
Retail, and while the quoted market shares are for the grocery market it might be the case that some of the 
retailers’ sales relate to non-grocery sales, especially where the retailers’ primary retail businesses are 
operating as department stores, warehouse clubs and other mixed goods retailers.  Accordingly, the 
reported figures in the table, especially in respect of market shares, should be treated cautiously as should 
the classification of the retailers as representing grocery retailers when in fact they might be more 
appropriately designated as other forms of retailers and distributors.  Indeed, a number of the retailers are 
multi-format retailers selling very different types of goods (e.g. Cencosud, Falabella, Centro Cuesta 
Nacional, Corporación Favorita, and Tia). 
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other cases more standard size hypermarkets and superstores (2,500-5,000 m
2
), as well as large 
supermarkets (1,500-2,500 m
2
), then mid-size and smaller supermarkets (around 500-1,500 m
2
), and the 
smallest sizes (less than 500 m
2
) represent convenience stores and other very small outlets. 
15. Another feature highlighted by Table 5 is the extent to which domestic and international retailers 
are competing for the top positions.  It is noticeable that European-based or US-based retailers hold top 
positions in most of these countries (French-based Carrefour and Casino holding the top positions 
respectively in Argentina and Brazil and Columbia and Uruguay, and US-based Walmart number one in 
Chile, Costa Rica, Guatemala, Honduras, and Mexico), but there are also regional-based leaders. 
Table 5. Leading Grocery Retailers in Selected Latin American Countries (2015f) 
Country Company Total Sales 
Area m2 
('000s) 
Average 
Sales Area 
m2 
Number of 
Outlets 
Total 
Grocery 
banner sales 
(US $m) 
Grocery 
Market Share 
% 
Argentina Carrefour 678 1,086 624 3,880 6.65 
 Cencosud 896 2,588 346 3,758 6.57 
 Dia 236 295 800 1,966 3.44 
 Coto 333 2,708 123 1,777 3.11 
 La Anónima 174 1,273 137 1,636 2.86 
Brazil Carrefour 1,588 5,630 282 10,314 2.98 
 Casino 1,734 1,753 989 10,232 3.56 
 Walmart 2,324 4,288 542 6,445 2.39 
 Cencosud 565 1,936 292 2,515 0.99 
Chile Walmart 945 2,368 399 4,845 11.37 
 Cencosud 1,345 3,645 369 4,508 10.66 
 Olimpica 323 1,192 271 1,243 2.46 
 SHV Makro 104 5,792 18 371 0.08 
 Alkosto 66 6,000 11 362 0.72 
Costa Rica Walmart 251 1,133 222 1,933 23.13 
 Auto Mercado 33 1,022 32 368 4.40 
 Gessa 86 1,323 65 305 3.65 
 PriceSmart 29 4,768 6 302 2.89 
 Olimpica 77 895 86 278 3.33 
Dominican 
Rep. 
Ramos 160 3,075 52 626 3.93 
 Centro Cuesta 
Nacional 
153 3,252 47 415 2.61 
 PriceSmart 11 3,810 3 141 0.71 
 Carrefour 9 9,000 1 52 0.33 
Ecuador Corporación 
Favorita 
276 2,071 133 1,503 6.23 
 El Rosado 237 1,631 145 906 3.76 
 Tia 101 579 175 594 2.46 
Guatemala Walmart 238 1,078 221 1,279 7.29 
 PriceSmart 14 4,650 3 130 0.59 
Honduras Walmart 62 752 83 498 7.96 
 PriceSmart 14 4,701 3 159 2.04 
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Country Company Total Sales 
Area m2 
('000s) 
Average 
Sales Area 
m2 
Number of 
Outlets 
Total Grocery 
banner sales 
(US $m) 
Grocery 
Market Share 
% 
Mexico Walmart 6,346 2,732 2,323 15,632 8.03 
 OXXO 1,723 117 14,707 7,193 3.87 
 Soriana 4,533 4,461 1,016 6,611 3.54 
 Chedraui 1,297 5,591 232 2,746 1.48 
 Safeway 
(USA) 
1,108 4,990 222 2,065 1.11 
Peru Falabella 946 5,471 173 1,292 3.09 
 Cencosud 358 3,286 109 1,281 3.07 
 Supermercad
os Peruanos 
293 2,595 113 1,266 3.03 
 SHV Makro 64 5,800 11 261 0.06 
Puerto Rico Supermercad
os Econo 
103 1,580 65 1,190 10.17 
 Walmart 476 8,504 56 1,088 8.79 
 Costco 76 19,000 4 309 2.11 
 Pueblo 66 3,495 19 239 2.04 
Uruguay Casino 82 1,287 64 705 7.25 
 Ta-Ta 69 639 108 601 6.17 
 Tienda 
Inglesa 
14 1,350 10 482 4.95 
Source: Author’s analysis based on data sourced from Planet Retail (http://www.planetretail.net) 
2.7 Consumer store choice 
16. While Table 5 indicates that at the national level the leading retailers do not appear to be holding 
individually dominant positions, nonetheless what matters for consumers is store choice at the local level.  
In this regard, the range of different types of retail outlets and variety of retail banners and formats 
available to local consumers is a critical aspect of competition.  However, competition between different 
retailers is only likely to be intense if consumers are very active in respect of their willingness to search out 
the best value for money and be prepared to switch stores to obtain best value, assuming there is choice 
available on a local basis.  Accordingly, it is interesting to note then which the main drivers for consumers 
to switch stores are, in terms of the “push” and “pull” factors that work to push consumers away from one 
retailer and instead encourage them to shop at another retailer.  Clearly, local and national differences are 
likely to exist, but Table 6 provides a perspective of the differences across the major global regions.  Here, 
it can be noted that for Latin America, compared to the other world regions, consumers are very much 
driven in their consideration of switching stores by prices and special promotions, indicating a high degree 
of price consciousness, but also there are quality factors that appear to be important to consumers in terms 
of product quality, store cleanliness, the product selection/assortment, and the staff.  Indeed, it is only in 
respect of convenience that Latin American shoppers appear to rate as less important than the other listed 
factors compared to the other world regions, which might be an indication that convenience is something 
that already exists, given the prevalence of independent retailers and small supermarkets, and perhaps it is 
the other elements that might be less in evidence, so seen as highly important.  
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Table 6. Grocery Store Switching Drivers across World Regions (Percent of consumers who say attribute 
drives them to switch stores) 
 Global 
Average 
Latin 
America 
North 
America 
Europe Asia/ Pacific Africa & 
Middle East 
Prices 68 77 72 70 63 69 
Product Quality 55 61 43 49 59 62 
Convenience 46 28 45 39 54 34 
Special Promotions 45 55 35 40 49 49 
Store Cleanliness 39 52 28 35 40 50 
Selection/Assortment 36 52 34 43 30 26 
Staff 27 44 21 29 24 34 
Source: Adapted from Nielsen “The Future of Grocery: E-Commerce, Digital Technology and Changing Shopper Preferences Around 
the World” (April 2015) 
2.8 Conclusion on retail sector structure 
17. The structure and composition of retailing in Latin America and the Caribbean is a mix of 
traditional and modern retailing.  Multiple chain-store retailers have been growing both domestically and 
internationally and it is evident that there is a broad range of different retail formats in operation serving 
different consumer needs.
7
  However, what is less evident from this brief overview of retailing across the 
continent is the extent to which there is local choice for consumers in terms of different retailer banners 
and formats to enable consumers to have an effective choice over where to shop and what to buy.  Indeed, 
it is these two elements that determine the nature and character of retail markets and the choices that 
consumers face, and it is this matter that is addressed next in terms of how to define retail markets. 
 
  
                                                     
7 
  For further insights and analysis on the key retail trends that are shaping retailing in Latin America, see 
Capizzani et al. (2012) which looks at trends related to the shopping experience, including store size, store 
format, location, product mix, private labels, and consumer preferences as well as online trends.  See also 
Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (2012) for a summary of the different strategies and market positions 
being pursued by the leading retailers operating in Latin America.  In addition, Basker and Noel (2013) put 
into context the development taking place in grocery retailing in this world region and its relevance to 
antitrust and competition assessment issues in respect of both structural and behavioural aspects.  Kobel et 
al. (2015, chapter 5) provides summary grocery retail sector details and cases in respect of Brazil.  Also, on 
Brazil, see OECD (2014) and de Barcellos et al. (2014) on the structure and sales levels of leading food 
retailers, where the top 10 retail chains account for an estimated 65 per cent of supermarket sales 
(http://thebrazilbusiness.com/article/the-10-largest-supermarket-chains-in-brazil).  
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3.  How should retail markets be defined? 
Market definition challenges 
18. In some situations, defining relevant economic markets can be a straightforward activity.  
However, market definition in retailing is complicated by the multiple contexts in which retailers operate – 
dealing with both procurement and retailing while often being national operators but with individual stores 
selling to local consumers – and the continuous spectrum of market positions that can be taken in respect 
of differentiation through a plethora of variables including service characteristics, general pricing policy, 
product range, store sizes, and location, amongst others. Ultimately, competition authorities need to decide 
on market definition in two dimensions: the product dimension and the geographic dimension.
8
  Each of 
these dimensions are considered in turn in this section of the paper. 
3.1 Product dimension 
3.1.1 Retail proposition as a price-quality-range-service combination 
19. Because retailers are service providers, the product dimension does not just relate to the type of 
goods sold (e.g. grocery, clothing, furniture, electrical, jewellery, toys, books, hardware, etc.) but it also 
relates to the service that retailers provide consumers and in this sense market definition needs to 
distinguish between how the retailers cater for the different shopping needs of consumers.  Retailers will 
often talk about their own competition in terms of their proposition to consumers in terms of “PQRS” as a 
“Price-Quality-Range-Service” combination making up the ingredients of the retailer’s offer.  
3.1.2 Price position 
20. Thus, for example, retailers might differ in terms of their “price” position – some high, some low, 
others with a high-low mix – but this difference is underscored by the value that consumers attach to the 
retail proposition by the quality offered, the range of goods stocked, and the service level provided.  For 
instance, the grocery retail sector might support a range of price positions, with some retailers operating at 
the high end of the market with “premium pricing” in providing superior products or a valued service like 
convenience, others at the low end of the market, as “EDLP” (“Every Day Low Price”) or discount 
retailers focused more on high turnover with a low margin, and others adopting a mid-market position 
perhaps using “High-Low” (“Hi-Lo”) promotional pricing (where higher regular prices are punctuated with 
frequent short-term price promotion discounts). 
3.1.3 Quality, range and service 
21. As for the other elements of the PQRS combination, “quality” can refer to both to the quality of 
the goods stocked or the level of service provided, such as the accessibility, convenience, ambience and 
facilities of the store as well as the helpfulness and customer service provided by the store’s staff.  “Range” 
refers to the number of different items stocked but also the depth and breadth of the assortment, so the 
number of product lines in any give product category as well as the spectrum of brands and different 
varieties, qualities and sizes on offer.  “Service” refers to a multitude aspects including the store’s location 
(e.g. city-centre or sub-urban), accessibility (including its opening times), convenience (in a location sense 
of being near to where consumers live or work as well as how quickly they can shop for their needs), 
                                                     
8 
 For a discussion of the different ways of determining market definition, see Bishop and Walker (Ch. 4, 
2010).  For more specific focus on defining relevant markets in retailing, see CC/OFT (2011) and Hosken 
and Tenn (2015). 
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facilities (e.g. car parking, crèche, home delivery, online ordering, and other product services like an in-
store café, pharmacy, dry cleaning, etc.) and also the sales service provided by the store’s staff.    
3.1.4 Consumers’ shopping needs 
22. In terms of the products and service offered and whether the different retailers providing these 
should be viewed as being in the same or different economic markets, what matters is the extent to which 
consumers are prepared to substitute amongst alternative retailers to make their required purchases. Often 
this can be simply down to the products sold when they all retailers might offer a very similar retail 
proposition to consumers, e.g. one newspaper-magazine retailer against another.  However, more often 
than not there are differences in the PQRS combination which mean that consumers might have a more 
restrictive substitute set than simply all retailers selling the particular products they are seeking to buy.  For 
example, in purchasing groceries it is possible that consumer needs might be significantly different in 
using large stores as opposed to small stores, where large stores might be able to provide a complete “one-
stop-shopping” service with an extensive product range for all consumer’s main or primary needs, while 
small stores with necessarily a more limited range can only cater for specialist or secondary needs, such as 
“top-up shopping” but provide for “convenience”, and so each size serves very different consumer needs at 
different times.
9
 
3.1.5 Retail types appealing to different consumer segments 
23. The foregoing example is where consumers have two needs but which arise at different times.  
An alternative case is where different retailers appeal to distinctly different clienteles which self-select and 
segment by their retailer choice. For example, one consumer group might only consider shopping in 
“upmarket” premium-price retailers while another group only considers shopping in “budget” discount-
price retailers.  There might even be a suitable sub-division in types which suggest the possibility of even 
narrower markets.  For instance, premium-price retailers might cater for different sub-groups of 
consumers, such as focusing on particular products like grocery wholefood retailers who might specialise 
in selling organic produce or gluten free, plant based, raw, or vegan healthy foods or, alternatively, they 
could be differentiated by their service quality like upmarket grocery retailers that sell superior quality 
products and provide a high level of sales service.  Similarly, discount retailers might also be sub-divided.  
For example, discount general merchandise “variety” stores could be divided into “single price point” 
(SPP) retailers (e.g. dollar stores or pound shops) as opposed to “value general merchandise” retailers 
(VGMs) operating a multi-price point business model,
10
 which in turn might be distinct from “limited 
assortment discounters” selling predominantly food but also some general merchandise as well as “off-
price discounters” specialising in discounting major-label brands (often in clothing but also homeware 
goods and some limited food lines), as again distinct from “warehouse clubs” where discount benefits arise 
from bulk buying across a wide range of goods.  
 
                                                     
9
  For example, this was the distinction used by the UK Competition Commission (2000) in its investigation 
of the UK supermarkets sector between those stores greater or less than those stores with sales areas of at 
least 1,400 square metres). 
10 
 For instance, this has been under consideration in a case being considered by the UK’s Consumer Markets 
Authority (2015a) in its assessment regarding the anticipated acquisition by Poundland Group plc of 99p 
Stores Limited. 
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3.1.6 Specialist and generalist retailers 
24. Similarly, consumers might in some instances, but not in other instances, regard specialist 
retailers and general retailers selling related products as being substitutes.  For example, specialist clothing 
boutiques and department stores might have very different customer bases even though they sell clothes 
and perhaps even sell some of the same brands.  Similarly, an increasingly common issue is about the 
extent to which supermarkets selling non-food product ranges compete with specialist retailers.  While the 
staple product range of supermarkets is in selling “groceries”, taken as food, drinks (including alcohol 
when permitted), cleaning products, toiletries, and household goods, it is not uncommon for the largest 
store operators (like “hypermarket” and “superstore” grocery retailers) to sell broad non-food ranges 
including clothing, books, toys, electrical appliances, hardware products, and pharmacy products as well as 
operating gasoline stations at the same location as their stores.  Even though these additional product 
ranges might not be core to these supermarkets, it might often be the case that the size, scale and reach of 
the network of their stores mean that they are major sellers of such products and might form part of the 
same competitor set in the eyes of consumers as specialist retailers. 
3.1.7 Asymmetric competitor sets 
25. However, this last point raises a further important aspect in that market definition might not be 
symmetric in the sense of different sets of competitors belonging uniquely to different economic markets.  
Instead, asymmetric relationships can exist where in the same market there might be one set of retailers 
limited to operate in that market but another set also competing in other markets.  For instance, large 
supermarkets might compete in selling domestic electrical goods with electrical goods specialists but the 
latter do not compete with supermarkets in selling groceries.  Moreover, this asymmetry might not only 
exist between product market specialists and general merchandise retailers but also even when only 
focusing on the same types of products.  For example, large format supermarket operators might compete 
with small format convenience stores for secondary top-up (small basket) grocery shopping but these 
convenience stores might not compete with the large supermarkets for the primary main (large trolley or 
cart) grocery shopping.  In this sense, small or specialist stores might be limited to operating in one 
product/service market, while it is possible that large general retailers might operate across several 
product/service markets.
11
 
3.1.8 Applying the hypothetical monopolist test 
26. The general approach for competition authorities making a market definition assessment on the 
product/service dimension is to begin by looking at the overlapping products of retailers in the narrowest 
plausible candidate product market and then to consider whether this can be widened primarily on the basis 
of demand-side considerations. For example, consumer surveys or household panel data (such as that 
collected by market research agencies) might show the extent to which consumers shop around and 
compare different retailers which they might regard as providing substitute services and how they might 
respond to price adjustments by the different retailers.  By starting with a narrow set of substitutes as a 
candidate market, then a competition authority might seek to apply the “hypothetical monopolist test” by 
identifying if a hypothetical firm that was the only present and future seller of the products in the candidate 
market would find it profitable to raise prices.  Under this approach, a candidate market will fail the 
hypothetical monopolist test, and will be too narrow to comprise the relevant market, if customers would 
respond to the price rise by switching to products outside the set to such an extent that the price increase by 
the hypothetical monopolist would not be profitable. The critical issue is whether the firm could profitably 
raise the price of at least one of the products in the candidate market by at least a small but significant 
                                                     
11 
 See, for example, the discussion on this aspect in the UK Competition Commission (2008) grocery markets 
inquiry.  
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amount over a non-transitory period of time (i.e. by a ‘SSNIP’—a small but significant and non-transitory 
increase in price – usually taken to be about 5 percent).12 
3.1.9 Defining retail markets and procurement markets 
27. In conducting such an analysis, it is usual to focus almost entirely on demand-side considerations 
in market definition analysis.  However, supply-side considerations should not be completely put aside 
because the response of suppliers to relative changes in prices might be important.  For instance, suppliers 
might be view a broader set of retailers as re-sellers of their goods as constituting a broad market for their 
goods, even if consumers might view markets more narrowly in respect of their purchasing behaviour, and 
it could be that this broader retail base affords consideration of aggregating seemingly very narrow markets 
to cater for the potential for substituting across retailers.  More generally, though, it is not unusual to see 
market definition as applying differently to retail markets, which is inherently about consumer behaviour 
and the group of retailers whose services are seen as substitutes and which serve to constrain each other on 
their retail pricing, as opposed to procurement markets, which are more naturally about the group of 
retailers that compete to buy particular products from the same pool of available suppliers.  In practice, 
defining both aspects is important if a competition assessment is going to take into account both retailer 
seller power over consumers (relating to the retail market definition) and retailer buyer power over 
suppliers (relating to the procurement market definition). 
3.2 Geographic dimension 
3.2.1 Consumer willingness to travel to shop 
28. Historically, retailing has been a highly fragmented sector where single (owner-run) independent 
store operators, and this still remains the predominant channel for many consumers across different 
countries in Latin America and the Caribbean. Increasingly, though, for most countries, it is common to 
find that chain-store retailers operating a network of stores under single ownership or through a franchise 
relationship dominate retailing for specific or general goods, including groceries.  These “multiple” 
retailers typically operate with common format stores using the same store fascia (i.e. retail brand name) 
and applying common stocking, pricing and marketing policies in multiple locations, where the combined 
geographical reach of the store network serves to give them a large regional or even national presence.  
Despite using the same store configurations with an essentially common retail proposition across their 
network of outlets, what primarily matters when considering the geographic extent of retail markets is 
consumers’ shopping behaviour.  In this respect, it is how far consumers are prepared to travel when 
considering the set of retailers from which they will select or shop around to make their purchases, which 
can be measured either in terms of a physical distance (e.g. one mile or kilometre, twenty miles or 
kilometres, etc.) or in terms of travel time (e.g. 10 minutes’ drive time or walk time). 
3.2.2 Physical distance and travel time alternatives 
29. In situations where stores are typically clustered together or in a set type of location, like in a city 
centre or shopping mall, then the market definition might be based on physical proximity measured by 
distance – e.g. the competitor set within one mile.13  Alternatively, where retailers are more scattered and 
tend to operate in a broader mix of locations, ranging from city centre to sub-urban areas, then what might 
matter more is the travel time by car for consumers, which might also vary according to whether it is an 
                                                     
12 
  For instance, the UK authorities’ approach to market definition in merger analysis is summarised in 
CC/OFT (2011).  However, for a critical perspective on the UK approach, see RBB Economics (2011). 
13 
 For instance, this is the definition that the UK Competition and Markets Authority (2015) has adopted 
when considering the geographic extent of the market for high-street discount variety stores. 
DAF/COMP/LACF(2015)13 
 20 
urban location where stores are densely location and willingness to travel might be low (say, 10 minutes) 
as opposed to a rural location where stores are spread more apart and so the willingness to travel might be 
higher (say, 15 minutes).
14
  For instance, where car travel is typically used to shop at stores, a local 
monopoly market area would amount to a situation in which, upon drawing an “isochrone” based on a set 
number of minutes (e.g. 10 minutes’ drive time) around a store, there were no other comparable stores by 
rival retailers within that area.  
3.2.3 Catchment areas 
30. In determining the appropriate distance or travel-time, a competition authority might seek to 
establish the average distance or drive-time for a catchment area based on the proportion of the store’s 
sales that originate within that drive-time or distance, that is, where customers representing those sales 
travel from to reach the store.  In determining the appropriate catchment area measure, the authority should 
consider the distribution of sales over a range of drive-times or distances, but as a rough guide the 
catchment area measure might be based on capturing the majority (say using a threshold of 60-80 per cent) 
of the store’s sales.15 
3.2.4 Local nature of shopping 
31. In practice, the geographic assessment may find that local markets overlap and it could be 
possible that this leads to a “chain of substitution” serving to integrate local markets into broader regional 
or even national markets.  However, fundamentally, consumers shop locally, even though the extent of 
their search and shopping activity depends on the type of goods (e.g. a short distance for relatively 
inexpensive or “convenience” goods and a longer distance for more expensive “shopping” goods), 
shopping occasion (e.g. a short travel-time distance for small and mid-size grocery stores mostly used for 
top-up purchases and a longer travel-time distance for large grocery superstores used for major primary 
(e.g. “weekly”) shopping needs), the mode of travel (e.g. walking or driving), or area type (e.g. a shorter 
distance for urban areas and a longer distance for rural areas).
16
 
3.2.5 Adapting the local offer to consumers 
32. It is usual for the main parties involved in a merger inquiry or market investigation to argue for 
the widest possible market definition in both product and geographical dimensions. One argument that can 
be made against the geographic extent of the market being highly localised is that chain-store retailers 
practice a uniform (e.g. national) pricing policy that applies across their store network, which is invariant 
to local concentration measures and the number of other retailers present in different localities.
17
 However, 
even if the parties have national uniform pricing, there are a number of other variables which retailers 
might adapt in response to local competition. These can include (i) the number and type of price 
                                                     
14 
 For instance, this was the definition used by the UK Competition Commission (2000; 2003; 2005; 2008) in 
considering the geographic market extent for large supermarkets. 
15 
  For details and supporting arguments, see OFT/CC (2011).  On the US approach, see Hosken and Tenn (2015). 
16  
 For a range of examples from different retail sectors and in different retail contexts, again see OFT/CC (2011). 
17 
 The extent to which chain-store retailers operate with common pricing across their store network varies 
from country to country and by store format.  For example, the uniform pricing evident amongst UK 
grocery retailers with centralised decision making contrasts sharply with the localised and zone pricing 
evident amongst US grocery retailers, where pricing decisions are related strongly to local demand and 
competition conditions.  Also, this can vary from one retail chain to another, in part because some chains 
want to portray a highly standardised and replicated format where there is a consistent offer from one 
location to another (e.g. hard discounters), while in other chains, such as wholesaler-led associations of 
independently owned retailers, there might be much more local control over pricing and other decisions. 
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promotions, vouchers, and special offers; (ii) differences in the extent and degree of local advertising; (iii) 
the quality of management and staff training; (iv) the product range, availability and quality of goods 
stocked; (v) the amount of pre- and after- sale service; (vi) aspects about the store including its layout, size, 
maintenance, decisions to refurbish; (vii) facilities and services at the store (including car parking, ATMs, 
café, and other complementary services); and (viii) store opening times.  Moreover, even if the retail 
proposition is largely uniform across different localities, prices may be a reflection of the average of local 
concentration rather than national concentration, so it remains the extent of competition at local markets 
that still determines the overall price level facing consumers even when retailers practise uniform pricing.
18
 
3.3 Conclusion on retail market definition 
3.3.1 Shopping needs and product ranges 
33. Defining retail markets is mainly about considering how consumers shop for the goods they 
require, and the choice set of retailers which they consider offer substitute services.  At the product level, 
retail markets may be narrower than the set of all retailers that sell particular goods because (a) consumers 
have different shopping needs for different occasions (e.g. large trolley “main” grocery shopping trips as 
opposed to small basket “top-up” grocery shopping trips), or (b) there might be substantial differences in 
the goods stocked and the manner in which they are sold by the different retailers (e.g. cheap clothes sold 
by discounters, mid-price clothes in general clothing shops and department stores, right through to 
expensive designer clothes sold by upmarket boutiques).  
3.3.2 Factors affecting consumer willingness to travel 
34. At the geographical level, retail markets are fundamentally local in nature because consumers are 
reluctant to spend time and money travelling too far to visit stores.  The only major exception is with 
online or catalogue retailing which provides a home delivery service, so not requiring the consumer to visit 
a physical store. However, the extent to which consumers will be willing to travel to visit different stores 
will very much depend on a range of factors.  As summarised above, these can include (a) the type of good 
(e.g. a short distance for low-value convenience goods and a longer distance for high-value shopping 
goods), (b) the purchase occasion (e.g. a short distance for a small top-up basket of groceries and a longer 
distance for a large trolley of groceries), (c) the mode of travel (e.g. a short distance like a mile with 
walking, or a longer distance like five miles by driving, or the equivalent physical distances expressed in 
travel times), and (d) the type of area (e.g. a short distance in an urban setting and a longer distance in a 
rural setting due to differences in the difficulty/ease of travelling and the available set of retailers 
determined by store density). 
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   This argument is formalised in Dobson and Waterson (2005).  For further discussion and more examples 
on how the retail offer may be tailored at the store level through micro-marketing, see Dobson (2006a). 
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3.3.3 Market definition in practice 
35. For retail grocery markets, there is a wide range of countries and jurisdictions in which market 
definition analysis has been undertaken as part of market investigations or court cases.  In some instances, 
the product dimension has been defined very narrowly. For example, in the US 2007 case of FTC. Whole 
Foods, the US FTC consider that the merging parties, Whole Foods and Wild Oats, were “premium natural 
and organic supermarkets” as a “distinct line of commerce”. In the UK, the Competition Commission has 
distinguished markets for grocery retailers based on store sizes (large, mid-size, and small).  In France, all 
sizes of supermarkets might be included in the definition of “general food stores”, but specialist stores and 
street traders are excluded.  Nevertheless, in France, as in the UK, there is recognition of the asymmetry 
that hypermarkets compete with supermarkets in the relevant market for “supermarkets” but not vice versa 
in the relevant market for “hypermarkets”, and similar asymmetry in the context of how small retail stores 
and supermarkets compete with each other.  For the geographic definition, the catchment area for a 
hypermarket is seen as around 15-20 minutes’ drive-time in western Europe (or a radius of 20-30 km) and 
more limited for mid-size stores of around 5-10 minutes.  In the US, distances have been expressed in 
miles, e.g. 3-4 miles radius for supermarkets and 5-6 miles for premium natural and organic 
supermarkets.
19
  For Latin America and the Caribbean, given the preponderance of traditional independent 
retailer and small supermarkets, it might be considered that retail grocery markets would be even more 
localised than these distances in different country contexts and particular consideration should be given to 
possible asymmetry in how small and large format retailers compete with each other in the way that 
consumers shop.
20
 
4 Is higher retail concentration inevitable and is that good or bad for consumers? 
Future direction of retail markets 
36. For any retail merger or market investigation it is important to consider not just the current 
situation but also the direction that the sector is heading to consider future economic welfare.  Are retail 
markets heading over time towards being more or less competitive?  Will retail markets become 
increasingly dominated by a handful of powerful retailers, perhaps even ultimately by just one supremely 
dominant player? Is the reverse possible, so that consumers face more choice over time from where and 
from whom to buy? 
                                                     
19 
 For further details on the retail grocery market definitions used in an array of countries, see Kobel et al. 
(2015). 
20 
 In respect of Brazil and consideration of supermarket mergers, Kobel et al. (2014, chapter 5, pp. 102-4) 
details the market definition approach taken by CADE, as the federal competition authority.  In terms of 
geographic market coverage, “areas of influence” are designated in terms of the radius in metres from each 
store as to contain 60% of customers, scaled relative to the number of checkouts (as an indication of store 
size) and population density (with the view that consumer willingness to travel declines with population 
density).  On product market definition, the relevant market for the grocer sector is identified as comprising 
all supermarkets (defined as 3-40 checkouts, 1,500-5,000 items, more than 300 m2 of sales area), 
hypermarkets (defined as carrying more than 5,000 items and a sales area larger than 5,000 m2), and self-
service wholesale stores, and excluding all bakeries, small grocery stores (with less than three checkouts), 
butchers, open markets and other small retail establishments which are viewed as not offering significant 
competitive pressure to the larger stores.  
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4.1 Path dependency and incumbency advantages 
4.1.1 Incumbency advantages acting as barriers to entry and mobility 
37. In part, the answers to these questions lie with the history of the sector and whether there are 
path-dependent forces at work taking the sector in a seemingly inexorable direction.  For example, it could 
be that a set of incumbent retailers possess an important set of first-mover advantages that then become 
obstacles to other players to enter or expand in the sector, serving to ossify the market structure.  Such 
barriers to entry and barriers to mobility emanating from incumbency advantages could come from a 
number of sources but typically might relate to (i) land – with all the best retail store sites having already 
been taken by incumbents (especially when there is a rigid planning system); (ii) supply chains – with all 
the best suppliers secured on an exclusive basis by incumbents; and (iii) consumer loyalty – with 
consumers familiar with and trusting established retail brands (and perhaps even retailers’ own goods when 
store brands and private label, and not just manufacturer brands, are important to consumers).   
4.1.2 Efficiency advantages of incumbents 
38. Such incumbency advantages become even more important barriers to entry and mobility when 
the efficiency of retailers critically depends on economies at different levels of the retail operation.  These 
can take several forms:  
 scale economies – where the sheer size of the retail operation provides efficiency benefits 
through economies of scale operating (i) at the store level (from spreading the fixed costs of 
stocking and selling products widely across multiple product lines and a high rate of turnover), 
(ii) at the chain level (from sharing resources across outlets, such as efficient shared warehousing, 
constructing stores on a common format design, operating chain-wide staffing and training, and 
negotiating bulk buying discounts from suppliers), and at the corporation level (from sharing 
resources across all retail formats and retail brands and applying specialist management expertise 
to all retail operations);  
 scope economies – where benefits can be achieved by offering additional products and services 
through providing cost synergies (such as products sharing in-store display space and shelving, 
shared warehousing, and the same staff selling different goods) and revenue synergies (where the 
stronger portfolio of additional products and services attracts more consumers or increases sales 
per consumer when consumers value reducing shopping/travel costs and being able to benefit 
from “one stop shopping”); 
 span economies – where the integration of the value-chain of retail operations, including 
integrated bar-code scanning and automated replenishment systems, means that throughput is 
faster and more efficient, with reduced inventory costs and less waste (which is especially 
important with perishable products like fresh produce and other short shelf-life groceries); and  
 network economies – where the store network density provides logistics and stock replenishment 
advantages to reduce transportation costs and the speed of stock replenishment, especially when 
served from warehouses as regional distribution centres, and when it also helps to “crowd out” 
other players to prevent them having similar benefits. 
 experience economies – successful retailing is both an art and a science and business knowledge 
and know-how builds over time, so the length of time and amount of experience from learning by 
doing can be important at all levels in the organisation, spanning from senior management to shop-
floor retail assistants as well as the lessons gained from collaborating with suppliers, producers and 
service providers that make up the entire supply chain, all combining to drive retail efficiency. 
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39. In short, it is a fallacy to believe that there are not important barriers to entry and mobility in 
retailing – just as with other key sectors of the economy.  Anyone can open a small independent shop, but 
only the few can build and sustain massive retail empires.
21
 
4.2 Drivers towards increasing retail concentration 
4.2.1 Extent of competitive advantage or disadvantage 
40. Given the possibility of strong incumbency advantages in retailing, it might be considered that 
these alone might take a retail sector along a path towards relentlessly increasing concentration.  However, 
what matters is the degree of advantage these afford and how effectively they are employed strategically to 
provide competitive advantage, while placing others at a competitive disadvantage.  This latter aspects is 
important in understanding not just the path dependency for the sector as a whole, but also for the 
individual players – with some retailers on a growth path and others on a decline path, which then 
inevitably leads to greater retail concentration.  The key principle at stake is whether some retailers are on 
a “virtuous circle” (or “upward spiral”) of growth, while others are in a “vicious circle” (or “downward 
spiral”) of decline.  In particular, because of the above noted economies at stake in retail operations, mostly 
attributable to retailer size, there can be a tendency for the big retailers to become bigger and the small 
retailers to become smaller or at least fewer in number, i.e. the sector consolidates towards one dominant 
or a few large multiple retailers and a shrinking number of small or independent retailers. 
4.2.2 Market share momentum 
41. The key driver for such a move towards a tendency for retail concentration and how virtuous and 
vicious circles might work in practice can be down to the importance of market shares and whether 
retailers can benefit or suffer from the momentum behind market share movements.  Such movements 
might be small or even imperceptible to start with but then could accelerate and differences become 
magnified over time.  In doing so, the performance gap between retailers can widen, driving increasing 
concentration over time as investment inequalities increase.  
4.2.3 Large retailers enjoying virtuous circles of growth 
42. The trigger for benefiting from a virtuous circle would seem to be that once some kind of 
competitive advantage (either differentiation or cost based) on the retail side is achieved then this can be 
translated into higher market share.  At this point, the retailer can benefit from further efficiency gains 
through reaping economies of scale and other economies (as noted above) along with greater control over 
its supply chain and notably increased buyer power of suppliers.  The combination of these benefits lead to 
high gross profits, through superior profit margins and higher volumes.  Crucially, these high gross profits 
can then be ploughed back into the business in the form of further expansion of the store network (i.e. 
opening new stores), improvements to existing stores (through improved store amenity and facilities) 
and/or investments in product and process innovation (e.g. developing store brands and label goods and 
improving logistical support) to provide a (further) differentiation advantage.  This, in turns, can allow the 
firm to increase its market share, and so on as the process repeats itself, all the time allowing the retailer to 
build market share.  Figure 1 illustrates this argument diagrammatically.
22
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  For further details and discussion on the different forms and magnitude of barriers to entry and mobility in 
retailing, see UK Competition Commission (2000; 2008) and Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission (“ACCC”) (2008). 
22 
 See Dobson (2009), where the operation of such circles are discussed in the context of UK supermarkets. 
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Figure 1. The Virtuous Circle of Growth for Large Retailers 
 
4.2.4 Small retailers suffering vicious circles of decline 
43. While large retailers might be enjoying the benefits of a virtuous circle promoting their growth in 
both absolute and relative terms, smaller retailers might face the exact opposite and be caught in a vicious 
circle of decline.  This is where a competitive disadvantage results in a firm losing some market share with 
the consequence of a loss of economies of scale and decreased buyer power feeding through to higher unit 
costs and reduced profits, in turn leading to reduced investments and a weakened retail offer, resulting in 
reduced market share, and so on.  This can not only affect individual retailers but whole sub-sectors of 
retailing where loss of market share can build momentum with the end result that many retailers may exit 
the sector.  This is particularly a concern with traditional independent retailers which do not have the scale 
and efficiency advantages of large closely integrated retail chains unless they can benefit from affiliation 
with other similarly positioned independents through associations or cooperatives that provide efficient 
buying and logistical supply (e.g. joint purchasing and supply coordinated by a major wholesaler) and 
shared marketing benefits (e.g. with a shared image through a common banner name and access to private 
label goods or other elements that allow effective competition with fully integrated retail chains).
23
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  For a discussion on the motives for horizontal alliances amongst small retailers with application to Brazil, 
see Ghisi et al. (2008). Despite the efficiency benefits that such alliances and associations may offer (such 
as through buying economies), competition law may restrict the extent of vertical and horizontal 
agreements permitted by authorities. For example, common pricing across members might be prevented if 
this is viewed as tantamount to resale price maintenance when vertically led by a wholesaler setting price 
lists or a retail cartel if horizontally led.  Similarly, there might be restrictions on joint purchasing 
requirements if viewed as restricting competition.  
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4.2.5 Anti-competitive behaviour undermining rivals 
44. From a competition standpoint, what is crucially important to recognise is how retailer seller and 
buyer power can interact and work together to drive market share changes and propel such circles, which 
then leads to higher retail concentration and the potential for ineffective competitive to result. To give an 
illustration, consider how large retailers might use seller power through anticompetitive practices which 
undermine small retailers’ market positions like large retailers.  For example, a large multiple chain-store 
retailer might seek to use below-cost pricing on some of its lines to intentionally target smaller or specialist 
retailers (whose product range is necessarily more limited).  Such targeted below-cost selling can have 
predatory effects both directly through causing small and specialist retailers to lose market share and 
indirectly through the loss of market share leading to worse trading terms with suppliers.  The latter 
indirect effect is an instance where the exercise of seller power affects differential buyer power amongst 
retailers, which in turn will widen retailers’ differential costs and so magnify differences in their respective 
competitive conditions, making predatory behaviour increasingly effective as differences widen.  
4.2.6 Regulation unwittingly supporting incumbency advantages 
45. However, the widening gap does not have to be driven entirely by deliberate strategic or 
predatory action. Importantly, government-created market restrictions can unwittingly impose a greater 
burden on smaller retailers than on larger retailers seeking to grow and this is most evident through 
government planning policy and the operation of planning systems.  For instance, planning policy might 
favour store extensions while new stores require a long planning process.  This might allow large 
incumbent retailers to grow more easily when they can simply extend their existing stores or build on 
existing land holdings.  Smaller, newer retailers may face greater barriers to expansion when tight planning 
restrictions limit new store openings.  Similarly, incumbency advantages can be exacerbated by licensing 
restrictions, zoning restrictions, FDI restrictions, and restrictions on competitive behaviour such as price 
controls that restrict price discounting (as these can make it harder for new entrants to provide a distinctive 
and novel retail proposition involving undercutting the prices of established rivals). 
4.2.7 Competition policy disadvantaging independent retailers 
46. Furthermore, it is not just government policy and business regulation in respect of planning and 
other restrictions on where and how retail activity takes place that could distort market positions by 
enhancing incumbency advantages. The way competition policy is designed and implemented could also 
limit the ability of different retail forms to compete effectively.  In this regard, it is common for 
competition policy to prohibit or restrict horizontal and vertical agreements, respectively amongst 
competitors at the same level of the supply chain and firms trading between different levels of the supply 
chain.  For instance, it is not unusual to ban separate firms at the same supply level collaborating together 
in what they might provide for customers, through the concern that this might lead to cartel-like collusive 
outcomes that will restrict competition and work against the interests of those customers, which is most 
evident in the logic advanced in banning horizontal price agreements.  Similarly, while it is accepted that 
trading firms at successive stages of a supply chain must cooperate to ensure that trade takes place and 
works effectively, it is not unusual to prevent these trading firms using vertical agreements that can restrict 
competition at their respective stages.  For example, this could include banning vertical price agreements 
in the form of resale price maintenance when the retailer has to re-sell the goods supplied by the supplier at 
a contractually fixed retail price, or banning exclusive supply arrangements which imposes exclusive 
purchasing obligations on retailers to only buy through a specific supplier.  In many contexts, there might 
be good economic reasons for prohibiting or restricting such horizontal and vertical agreements. However, 
this policy could severely disadvantage independent retailers if they operated through associations, either 
horizontally managed in the form of retailer cooperatives or vertically managed through a wholesaler-led 
association of independent retailers, simply because they had a different ownership structure from a 
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vertically-and-horizontally-integrated multiple chain-store retailer. Specifically, the integrated ownership 
of a chain-store retailer would permit such agreements as an internal business matter, but competition 
policy might, perhaps unwittingly, prevent independent retailer associations benefiting in the same way.  
The result could be that competition policy on vertical and horizontal agreements might create an uneven 
playing field, favouring large integrated multiple retailers but disadvantaging independent retailers who are 
simply grouping together to try and remain efficient and competitive, with the upshot that the unequal 
treatment reinforces retail consolidation tendencies. 
4.2.8 Retail buyer power driving growth/decline circles  
47. This point leads in turn to consideration about supply chain relations which might feed through to 
propel virtuous and vicious circles and so drive retail consolidation.  Firstly, there might be a barrier to 
entry or mobility issue, where to obtain additional grocery supplies the large established retailers can rely 
and draw on their extensive network of existing suppliers while smaller, newer retailers may be prevented 
access to key supplies due to suppliers already being at full capacity in supplying the large retailers or the 
suppliers preferring not to trade with the rivals of their major retail customers for fear of losing future 
contracts with them.  Secondly, and building on the last point, suppliers will be keen to focus on trading 
with the very largest retailers when this guarantees them a large level of sales and may be prepared to offer 
more favourable trading terms to these large retailers to gain that security of large sales.  This might then 
afford these large retailers differential buyer power, allowing them to obtain lower supply prices than 
smaller rivals, which they can then partly pass on to consumers with lower retail prices, where these 
discounts then allow to grow their market share, which in turn reinforces their buying power and the 
eagerness that suppliers will have to trade with them. 
4.2.9 Favourable supply terms for large retailers  
48. However, the last point begs an important question: why should suppliers give more generous 
supply terms to large retailers?  Empirical studies have supported this finding.
24
 Nevertheless, it is 
important to understand and appreciate the mechanism by which this can arise, and equally understand its 
limits, not least since suppliers will be conscious that they will not want to ultimately face just a single 
buyer who can squeeze them to the point of capturing all available profits in the supply chain.  Suppliers 
will ideally want to ensure that they have alternative routes to final consumers and so wish to maintain a 
broad base of retailers they can supply.  However, if faced with the prospect of its products being delisted 
by a large powerful retailer and replaced by a rival supplier, then a supplier might have little scope but to 
give in to demands for providing more favourable terms of supply. 
4.2.10 Gatekeeper power 
49. We should appreciate that retailers which have large, loyal and/or distinct customer bases will be 
relatively well positioned in bargaining with suppliers who are keen to gain shelf space and thereby access 
this pool of consumers.  Holding a strong “gatekeeper” position, such retailers should be well placed to 
play off suppliers against each other to obtain the best possible terms; the more so if they can extend 
supplier competition by sponsoring new entry through operating their own private label product ranges.  In 
contrast, other, particularly smaller retailers may not be so fortunate.  Having fewer (and probably less 
loyal) shoppers and fewer supplier substitution options (especially when they rely on selling just key 
brands and cannot afford investments in developing private label ranges), suppliers will not be so desperate 
to offer favourable terms and conditions of trade to such retailers.   
                                                     
24
   On empirical estimates of the price advantage enjoyed by the largest UK supermarkets, see the analysis of 
differential buyer reported by the UK Competition Commission (2000; 2008). 
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4.2.11 Inter-linkage of retailer buyer and seller power 
50. The point is that an individual retailer’s buyer power may depend on its seller power.  To the 
extent that the latter is linked to retailer size, then with different retailer sizes we should expect to observe 
differential buyer power resulting in larger retailers obtaining better terms than smaller retailers.  However, 
this in turn is likely to affect retail competition on the selling side.  With smaller retailers already at a 
competitive disadvantage from not having the scale economies and resources of larger retailers, differential 
buyer power could further tilt the already imbalanced playing field.  As a consequence, large retailers 
could be better positioned to gain additional shoppers and increase market share at the expense of smaller 
retailers.  With increased market share, large retailers would then likely be in an even stronger position to 
exert buyer power while smaller retailers would be in a weaker position in future negotiations with 
suppliers.  This would widen the gap in differential buyer power, and further extend the relative 
competitive disadvantage of smaller retailers vis-à-vis large retailers.  
4.2.12 Waterbed effect 
51. As a consequence of such differential buyer power, small retailers can suffer a “waterbed effect” 
where the improved terms for larger retailers ultimately lead to worse terms (in both a relative and absolute 
sense) for them.
25
  Moreover, once initiated, this process could become self-perpetuating, with the 
widening gap in terms received from suppliers strengthening the market position of large retailers but 
weakening that of small retailers.  This, in turn, may allow large retailers to gain market share at the 
expense of small retailers, thereby further widening their relative ability to exert buyer power, and so on.  
Consequently, ever widening differential buyer power may assist large retailers to benefit from a virtuous 
circle of growth while small retailers suffer a vicious circle of decline.  
4.2.13 Counterbalancing bargaining effects 
52. Even if we accept this logic, we should appreciate that there might be limits on how far this 
argument can be carried.  Firstly, just as powerful retailers might wish to play off suppliers against each to 
negotiate the best terms and lowest supply prices, then powerful suppliers might wish to play off retailers 
against each to improve terms and negotiate higher supply prices, and thus benefit by keeping smaller 
retailers in play by providing them with favourable terms.  Secondly, in the limit where one retailer 
becomes a dominant buyer, it might reach a point where it uniquely provides a “pivotal role” in sponsoring 
entry or maintaining viability for its suppliers because of its sheer size, to the extent that without generous 
contracts these suppliers would not exist, allowing smaller retailers to free ride on these suppliers being 
kept in play by agreeing lower supply prices with them (i.e. once the suppliers’ fixed costs are covered).26 
                                                     
25  
 Note that this a more involved argument than the naive perspective often attributed to a waterbed effect 
argument that runs along the lines that as a major retailer uses its buyer power to extract greater discounts 
from suppliers then these suppliers compensate for their lost income by raising prices to smaller retailers 
(say, to cover their fixed costs or achieve a certain targeted profitability level).  The fallacy of this 
argument is that if suppliers were able to raise prices to small retailers then they would have done so 
already and not have waited until forced to give discounts to the major retailer.  For details on the 
underlying economic theory about the market circumstances that can more credibly allow for a waterbed 
effect to arise and the consequences for consumer welfare, see Dobson and Inderst (2007; 2008) and 
Inderst and Valletti (2011). 
26 
 This “pivotal role” argument is developed by Raskovich (2003) and Adilov and Alexander (2006). 
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4.2.14 Effects on consumer welfare 
53. A further aspect is that even if it is found and accepted that virtuous and vicious circles are 
operating, giving rise to contrasting fortunes for large and small retailers, and the retail sector is becoming 
more concentrated over time, it does not necessarily mean that consumer welfare will suffer.  To the extent 
that increased retail concentration results in increased retailer efficiency, while still allowing for intense 
competition between a group of evenly placed leading retailers, then consumers may continue to benefit from 
low prices and without significant loss of choice or amenity; especially where small retailers can successfully 
occupy differentiated niche positions.  However, if the market becomes very asymmetric, allowing one or 
two very large retailers to dominate the market and all other retailers struggling to survive, then price 
competition may be dampened and choice and amenity may be reduced; all to the consumer’s detriment.  
4.3 Factors limiting the extent of retail concentration 
4.3.1 Positive dynamic forces 
54. While the logic of virtuous and vicious cycles working to consolidate retail markets sounds 
intuitive and appealing, we should not rule out counteracting forces which might provide a more positive 
dynamic for the retail sector to ensure that retail markets remain fluid and highly contestable.  If the full 
logic of the waterbed effect and the operation of virtuous/vicious cycles was carried right through then 
ultimately we would be left with the retail sector controlled by a “winner takes all” monopoly position.  
There can be a number of reasons why in fact this is not likely to happen beyond competition authority 
intervention to prevent mergers and break up monopoly positions. 
4.3.2 Limits to retail growth 
55. First, there may be practical reasons why the virtuous circle runs out of steam for many if not 
most retailers.  For example, even successful retailers might reach the limits of growth when there is 
market saturation or victims of their own success when there are limits to retail brand appeal, and indeed 
work negatively from over-exposure of the retailer’s presence that could lead to brand fatigue in 
consumers’ eyes and negative sentiment, as well the possibility of complacency setting in and poor 
management decisions happening when competition is ignored and treated as irrelevant.  This may then 
open up opportunities for other retailers to fill with a differentiated offer, perhaps through competing with 
a different image, different store locations, and an innovative retail service or novel product range. 
4.3.3 Limits to squeezing suppliers 
56. Secondly, and following the above point about a dominant retailer holding a “pivotal role” in 
retailing actually being a bargaining liability rather than an advantage, it seems reasonable to consider that 
suppliers can only be squeezed so far before their viability is undermined and to the extent that a major 
retailer then holds a pivotal buying position, determining whether suppliers stay in business or exit the 
market, it may be forced to support their continued existence by limiting its demands.  
4.3.4 Supplier consolidation and countervailing power  
57. Thirdly, supplier competition itself may be impacted whereby the increased retailer buyer power 
of the growing major retailers pushes the producer sector to consolidate (either as a result of some 
suppliers being forced out of business or induced to merge in order to compete more effectively).  This 
consolidation might restore suppliers’ profitability by allowing them to set higher prices (if at different 
levels to different customers and thus may be a further source of a waterbed effect).  However, it might 
also create “must-use” supplier positions where retailers have no ready alternative (to suppliers’ “must-
stock” products) and so cannot exploit buyer power regardless of how advantageous is their retail position.  
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In this respect, in the face of strong retail buyer power, supplier consolidation offers a means of generating 
countervailing bargaining power to help suppliers better withstand the bargaining pressure being exerted 
by powerful retailers.  Nevertheless, whether this countervailing power is socially benign and leads to 
consumer benefits or simply a coalescence of market power conspiring to harm consumers is a moot point 
and likely to depend very much on the dynamic of the supply chain and whether consolidation at both 
levels will lead to mutual recognition of the need to avoid antagonistic competition to protect profits at the 
expense of consumers’ interests.27  
4.3.5 Retail new entry and cross entry 
58. Fourthly, despite the presence of barriers to entry and expansion, it is possible that retail markets 
may be kept dynamic by the innovation and spread of new retail formats and new retail business models, as 
well as cross-entry from adjacent retail sectors lured by the attraction to make a profitable pitch for 
disaffected consumers.   Thus large retailers seeking to exploit their strong market position might in itself 
attract new competition, so profitable exploitation could be short lived rather than sustained when new 
entry or expansion by rivals is feasible.  Indeed, this has been observed when large incumbent retailers tend 
to concentrate on the so-called “big middle” market position,28 where the bulk of consumers lie, but are 
then exposed to attack at the bottom end of the market, with the emergence of lean, super-efficient, low-
cost “hard discounters”, and at the top end of the market, from “upmarket” retailers and specialist niche 
retailers, focusing on providing a differentiated high quality service and high quality product range.
29
  
Similarly, there are cross-entry opportunities.  Just as some large supermarkets have moved into selling a 
wide range of non-food goods like electrical products, clothes, books, music/video, and homeware, equally 
general merchandise retailers, department stores and variety stores have an opportunity to increase their 
food lines.  However, perhaps it is through the internet and potential penetration for online retailing that 
offers the greater possibility for profitable cross-entry and expansion into selling a variety of products, to 
the point where selling vast product ranges becomes feasible if there is warehousing capacity.
30
 
4.3.6 Phases of retail life cycles 
59. Fifth and lastly, and this relates to the first point made above about complacency setting in and 
virtuous circles running out of steam, there is an old and established principle in the evolution of retailing 
with the notion of the “wheel of retailing” where retailers go through different phases in their life cycle.31  
The principle is that established “mature retailers” hit a vulnerable phase, especially when they are 
characterised by top-heaviness in management, conservatism and risk averse to trying new approaches and 
                                                     
27 
 For a more detailed discussion on how competing, countervailing and coalescing forces can operate in the 
retail sector, see Dobson (2006b). 
28
  On the relevance and importance of the “big middle” market position to retail markets, especially in the 
retail grocery sector, see Levy et al. (2005). 
29 
 For instance, this has been a noticeable pattern in the UK in the last couple of years, where Aldi and Lidl as 
limited assortment discounters and Waitrose and Marks & Spencer as upmarket retailers have all grown their 
market share at the expense of the big mainstream supermarket chains, and particularly the market leader, Tesco, 
has suffered hugely as a result in experiencing declining market share and a huge decline in 
its profitability (e.g. see http://www.standardlifeinvestments.com/GRE_Insight_UK_Supermarkets/getLatest.pdf). 
30 
 For example, even online specialist retailers like Amazon.com which started off by selling books has now 
established itself as a full retail platform selling vast ranges of products, even to the extent of online 
grocery retailing in some countries (e.g. see 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/wendyliebmann/2013/06/25/amazon-changes-the-game-again/ and 
http://www.retailthinktank.co.uk/white-papers/the-future-of-the-grocery-sector-in-the-uk). 
31 
 This idea was first formalised by McNair (1958) and Hollander (1960), but see also Brown (1987; 1990). 
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new formats, and declining return on investment arising from complacency and bloated costs.  Such mature 
retailers are then vulnerable to losing share to new “innovative retailers” who can prosper on the basis of a 
distinctive offering or particularly a low-cost minimalist basis with limited product offerings, a basic 
service and often poor store facilities but selling at ultra-keen prices.  This innovative positioning allows 
them to grow their customer base and then make investments to gradually trade-up to morph into 
“traditional retailers” by bolting on additional services, taking up higher rent locations, with more elaborate 
facilities and an extended product offer. However, their continued growth leads to become “mature 
retailers”, so themselves vulnerable to new entry and decline.  Indeed, history is quite telling that many 
once seemingly almighty retailers with apparently unassailable and impregnable market positions did 
eventually decline and fall out of favour as new, innovative retailers gained ground.  Only time will tell if 
current dominant retailers will retain their strong position.  However, shifting shopping patterns can have 
dramatic effects, and so for instance where big-box retailers, whether hypermarkets or category killers, 
only a few years ago seemed thoroughly dominant, the combination of consumers choosing to shop online 
for non-food goods and buying more frequently and in smaller amounts for foods from smaller 
convenience stores, have made such large-format retailers vulnerable and exposed to sharply declining 
values in their property portfolios and so undermining their overall profitability.
32
  
4.4 Overall assessment 
4.4.1 Need for careful empirical analysis 
60. Given these opposing arguments about whether retail consolidation is inevitable or has its natural 
limits, competition authorities need to undertake a careful empirical assessment to determine the nature, 
overriding direction and speed at which dynamic processes are operating and the extent to which barriers 
to entry and expansion are inhibiting the competitive process.  This is especially important if the sector is 
on track for relentless consolidation given that such a situation may lead on to future market ossification if 
a limited set of retailers were completely to dominate the sector and learn to avoid intense profit-damaging 
competition.  As well as providing a better understanding of the dynamic competitive processes in local 
retail markets, such empirical analysis could be directed at considering how effective and consistent retail 
buyer power is exercised and whether this is solely the preserve of the very largest chains or whether it is 
possible for skilful smaller chains to negotiate competitive (if not sometimes better) deals.  Put simply, is 
the gap in net supply prices across retailers increasing or stable/declining over time and how is this 
impacting retail competition?  Or, to put it another way, to what extent do large retailers benefit from better 
terms of trade with suppliers, and are the terms of trade becoming worse in both relative and absolute terms 
for small retailers?  Also, is there any evidence that large retailers are leveraging their market power to 
deliberately undermine smaller retailers, through predatory tactics in abusing their seller power (e.g. with 
selective below-cost selling) in retail markets or restricting supplies by abusing their buyer power (e.g. 
requiring exclusive trading from their suppliers) in procurement markets?  Finally, is there evidence that, 
through a coalescence of market power and perhaps involving the exchange of information with suppliers, 
the different major retailers have devised ways, either unilaterally or in a coordinated manner, to avoid 
intense rivalry and competing head-to-head to prevent consumers gaining the benefits from otherwise 
lower prices and an improved retail offer? 
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  On the decline of big-box retailers, see http://business.time.com/2012/05/24/are-we-witnessing-the-death-
of-the-big-box-store/ and http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/30/big-box-store-
dying_n_5630572.html; and on the decline of hypermarkets and consumers shopping around more, see 
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/retailandconsumer/11141300/Shoppers-lose-appetite-
for-bigsupermarkets.html and http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-29442383. 
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4.4.2 Implications for mergers analysis 
61. Of course, mergers between large retailers will likely substantially increase market concentration 
but this need not necessarily be anti-competitive if competition remains vigorous.
33
  First, appropriate 
market definition analysis should identify those markets where there is a risk of a substantial lessening of 
competition and a likelihood of upward pricing pressure and/or consumers facing less choice, quality or 
innovation.  Second, the merger might well offer efficiency benefits to the merging parties, so if 
competition is not significantly weakened then the merger should proceed unhindered.  Third, in situations 
where there are competition concerns about specific (but not all) markets then authorities should look to 
see if a suitable remedy can be applied; preferably a structural remedy as a permanent fix rather than a 
behavioural remedy that requires ongoing monitoring.  For instance, with retail markets, it might be 
concerns about specific geographic local markets where local concentration is already high so competition 
concerns are already pronounced, but these concerns could be addressed by suitable store divestments.  
Fourth, authorities should take heed of the track record and business model of the acquiring retailer, and if 
it has a history of being an innovative and positive force by disrupting and shaking up competition then 
credence should be given to its commitments to deliver benefits to consumers when it can really benefit 
from the greater efficiencies and improved reach to consumers facilitated by the merger, but only if strong 
competition can be assured to continue in the longer term such as through the merger making competition 
less asymmetric.
34
   
5.  Is retailer dominance over suppliers good or bad for economic welfare? 
62. Retailing has witnessed many changes over the last few decades, not least the spread and 
prevalence of large chain-store retailers that have come to dominate the retail scene in most areas of retailing 
and in most countries.  This is not to say that small, independent retailers have disappeared and have no key 
role to play in competition, because they still remain an important feature of many retail markets, as plainly 
evident in Latin America and the Caribbean, and they continue to provide choice and a distinctive offer for 
consumers.  However, it is the emergence and increasing domination by chain-store retailers, either fully 
integrated in terms of owning the entire store network or by contractual agreements through associations of 
independent store owners sharing common branding and operations, which are profoundly changing the face 
of retailing and for which most consumers increasingly rely on for their main purchases.  
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 Hosken et al. (2012) review the impact of retail mergers from a US perspective highlighting the importance 
of market concentration as a key factor in determining whether prices increases post-merger.  Davis (2010) 
shows how post-merger pricing behaviour may also change, finding evidence of less price discounting and 
fewer price promotions. Allain et al. (2014) show the significance of raised local concentration supporting 
higher prices.    
34
   An interesting example was in the UK, when back in 2003 the then fourth ranked grocery retailer, 
Safeway, was the target for contemplated acquisitions by the other top five retailers.  However, the 
Competition Commission (2003) ruled out the top three retailers (Tesco, Asda and Sainsbury’s) from 
proceeding with the acquisition but did allow the fifth ranked retailer, Morrisons, to proceed with the 
acquisition subject to making a number of store divestments in specific locations where local concentration 
would be significantly raised by the merger.  The Morrisons-Safeway merger was concluded in early 2004.  
Morrisons had promised the Competition Commission during the inquiry that it would cut Safeway stores 
prices immediately upon acquisition.  As Chakraborty et al. (2014) show in a very detailed post-merger 
review of the subsequent pattern on grocery prices in the UK, Morrisons delivered on its promise and price 
competition in the whole sector seems to have been intensified even several years on after the merger.  Of 
course, we will never know what would have happened if one of the top three retailers had been allowed to 
conclude the merger, but this post-merger evidence does point to the Competition Commission making the 
right decision not to block Morrisons.  For further post-merger evaluation analysis on this case, see 
Skrainka (2012) which builds on Smith (2004). 
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5.1 Retailer-led supply chains 
5.1.1 Supply-push vs. demand-led supply systems 
63. This ascent of chain-store retailers to dominate many retail sectors around the world has led to a 
fundamental change in the organisation and control of supply chains.  It used to be the case that supply 
chains were very much dominated by major consumer-goods producers, who would coordinate the 
production of their goods from their own raw material suppliers and then choose and use retailers merely 
as a means of distributing those goods to consumers. However, now the tables have been turned.  
Increasingly, it is the large retailers who control supply chains, coordinating the supply of goods to their 
stores and making sure producers cater for their precise needs.  The difference is quite stark.  The former 
model is very much about a producer-led “supply-push” approach, while the latter is about a retailer-led 
“demand-pull” approach.  The two contrasting approaches are illustrated in Figure 2, where the difference 
might be encapsulated by whether it is the producer or retailer that is the more important brand to 
consumers in determining where they shop and what they buy. 
Figure 2. Supply Chain Control (Supply Push v. Demand Pull) 
 
 
64. It is important to appreciate how this change has come about, why it makes a fundamental 
difference to the power relationship in supply chains, and its implications for consumers and economic 
welfare more generally in changing the nature of competition throughout supply chains. 
5.1.2 Suppliers’ economic dependence on major retail customers 
65. First for foremost, the rise in retailer power, associated with increasing retail concentration and 
significant barriers to entry (e.g. arising from required sunk investments in developing retail brands, store 
portfolios, IT/logistical/supply-chain infrastructure, and specialised personnel, as well as institutional 
restrictions such as planning regulations), has allowed major multiple retailers to exploit the increasingly 
important gatekeeper role they occupy for producers seeking to sell goods to final consumers.  Producers 
now face fewer choices as to which retailers they can use to distribute their goods and if scale economies 
are important to them then they will be desperate to have contracts with multiple retailers that control large 
market shares and have the greatest reach to consumers.  This opens up the prospect that suppliers may 
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become “economically dependent” on major retailers to the extent that they would be willing to concede to 
their control of the supply chain relationship.  
5.1.3 Control over integrated supply systems and sales data 
66. A second supporting feature has been the growing significance of data management and the way 
that information technology (“IT”) is integrated with modern logistics and replenishment systems, so that 
bar code scanning on store sales triggers automatic ordering for re-stocking, thus integrating the entire 
operation of the supply chain into a seamless operation that facilities quick response and just-in-time 
systems that reduce storage and waste costs.  Here, it is the retailer’s control of consumer sales data that is 
the driver for such integrated supply systems and so makes the retailer the natural coordinator for the entire 
supply chain. 
5.1.4 Coordinating large networks of suppliers 
67. A third factor is the sheer size of modern retail outlets and the vast numbers of product lines they 
stock, where it is not untypical for grocery hypermarkets to stock over 20,000 different products and 
similarly big-box category killer retailers and large department store also stocking vast ranges of goods, 
and in the process using a huge network of different suppliers.  This is very much in contrast to traditional 
retailers, which might have sold a limited number of lines from a smaller set of suppliers, and perhaps 
using a single wholesaler to meet those needs, or a single brand store which serves as a dealer or franchisee 
for a single producer (e.g. as might be found with clothing, jewellery/watches, cars, furniture, and coffee 
shops, etc.).  For large multi-brand retailers and the need to coordinate across a huge network of different 
suppliers, it makes obvious business sense for the retailer to act as the coordinator in determining which 
products to stock, how to allocate display space, which goods to feature or promote, and how it wants 
products to be designed and tailored to meet the needs of its customer base and clientele. 
5.1.5 Changes in the direction of vertical control 
68. A fourth factor, and more historical in nature, is that previously it might have been possible for 
manufacturers to be allowed to dictate to retailers the way their goods were sold and particularly how they 
were priced when resale price maintenance (“RPM”) agreements were enforceable.  However, competition 
law in many jurisdictions now often prohibits RPM or only allows it in the form of a price ceiling (i.e. 
maximum RPM) or a manufacturer price recommendation.
35
  In the past, when RPM could have been 
enforced, a manufacturer could oblige all its dealers to sell its goods at the same price, so avoid intra-brand 
competition.  However, with RPM not enforceable, retailers are free to set whatever retail prices they 
consider appropriate, and so taking away the control of the manufacturer to dictate how they must price 
and sell its goods.  Unshackled from vertical price control, retailers have used discounting to increase their 
size and market share which in turn has allowed them to build greater power in bargaining with 
manufacturing, whereby improved supply terms can offer them further competitive advantage in the retail 
marketplace, and so on as explained with the virtuous circle notion explained above.  Indeed, it is now the 
case that the tables have been turned to such an extent it is the retailers that are leading and dictating 
vertical restraints to their suppliers, rather than vice versa as might have been the case in the past. 
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  Even so, the competition law stance against RPM may now be softening and a rule of reason approach 
rather than per se prohibition might be taken even for fixed or minimum RPM which prevents retailers 
discounting goods. For instance, see the discussion and views on RPM of different authorities in OECD 
(2008). 
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5.2 Retail control of supply chains and forms retailer buyer power 
5.2.1 Retailers as customers, competitors and suppliers to producers 
69. Before discussing the significance of these retailer-led vertical restraints, it is important to 
understand how far the changes in the control of the supply chain might have affected the position of 
suppliers.  It remains the case that there are still powerful brand producers, often with a multinational or 
even global presence with a loyal consumer base that provides them with a strong competitive advantage 
over their rivals, such as household name brands which consumers trust and repeatedly buy in preference 
to other available brands or private label alternatives even if available at a substantial discount.   Yet, even 
major brand producers may be engulfed by the different relationships that a key retailer represents to them.  
For example, a key retailer may act as their “customer” (for the route to consumers), as their “competitor” 
(in making private label goods) and as their “supplier” (in providing shelf and in-store advertising space).  
These three roles may then be jointly exploited to ensure that the retailer controls the relationship with the 
brand producer.  In this way, the retailer can the enjoy the advantage of acting as the “gatekeeper” for 
access to consumers and a “double agent” in selling branded goods while at the same time developing and 
selling its own private label goods.  This broadens its scope to play off suppliers against each other to 
obtain the most preferential terms while in the process being able to increase its competitive advantage 
over smaller retail rivals.  As such, it may facilitate the retailer entering into and then capitalising on a 
virtuous circle where buyer power begets seller power and vice versa, all the time increasing domination 
over suppliers and competitors.  
5.2.2 Assessing retailer-led vertical restraints 
70. With major retailers in the ascendency and leading the coordination of supply chains, they might 
seek to enhance that control further by the types of agreements they strike with their suppliers, and in 
particular how they might impose retailer-led vertical restraints that restrict the behaviour, actions or 
outcomes for their suppliers through the contracts, agreements and understandings they enforce.  
Agreement or acquiescence to retailer-led vertical restraints might come about as bargaining concessions to 
powerful buyers or just be part of custom-and-practice in trading relationships, but they may directly or 
indirectly affect the nature of competition in supplier markets.  Equally, they may also affect competition 
in retail markets when retailers possess seller power in addition to buyer power.  Consequently, it will be 
important to assess their economic effects and whether such restraints serve to prevent, restrict or distort 
competition that is ultimately to the detriment of consumers through an adverse effect of the prices, choice, 
quality, or innovation they face.  In particular, an assessment is required as to whether retailer-led vertical 
restraints generate or extend market power to the detriment of consumers.  Nevertheless, as with any form 
of vertical agreement, it needs to be recognised that there can be efficiency benefits associated with such 
practices, because vertical restraints which aid control might also help make the supply system more 
efficient and effective.  Accordingly, a balanced assessment by the competition authority is required. 
5.3 Types of Retailer-led Vertical Restraints 
5.3.1 Retailer buyer power and contractual obligations on suppliers 
71. It is usual to think about retailer buyer power as being expressed simply through the ability to 
obtain from suppliers more favourable terms than those available to other retailers, or which would 
otherwise be expected under normal competitive conditions.  For instance, this might arise as a 
consequence of size differences among retailers (essentially advantages based on scale) or if there are a 
limited number of buyers of a certain scale (i.e., an oligopsony).  Yet, retail buyer power represents more 
than just the ability to extract discounts and obtain low prices from suppliers.  Buyer power can also 
manifest itself in the contractual obligations that retailers may be able to place on their suppliers to obtain 
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more favourable non-price terms through negotiating or imposing restrictions and particular conditions of 
trade (i.e., beyond price) on suppliers of goods and services. 
5.3.2 Direct and indirect financial benefits 
72. These additional terms and conditions of trade beyond the unit price of the supplied good or 
service may be aimed at providing the retailer with a direct financial benefit, such as requirements on 
suppliers to pay lump-sum payments to initiate or continue trading with the retailer.  Alternatively, they 
could be used as a means of securing more indirect financial benefits.  For example, retailer enforced 
application of most-favoured-customer clauses, which oblige the supplier not to sell to another retailer at a 
lower price, guarantee that the retailer will not be placed at a purchase cost disadvantage relative to a rival 
retailer.  Similarly, exclusive supply arrangements deny other retailers access to the supplier’s product, 
which may allow the retailer to gain a product differentiation advantage over its rivals in retail markets.  
Furthermore, the terms and conditions of trade applied by a powerful retailer may also be about shifting the 
burden of any financial risk squarely on to suppliers.  For instance, the retailer may require the supplier 
accept the return of unused or unsold supplies or impose long delays in payment (to protect its own cash 
flows but at the supplier’s expense).  In a similar vein, if there is the prospect of a supply disruption or 
delay, then a powerful retailer may insist that it receives supplies ahead of other rival retailers, thereby 
shifting the risk of non-availability on to its rivals. 
5.3.3 Non-price requirements through bargaining leverage 
73. As with demands to grant price discounts, suppliers may be under considerable pressure to agree 
to such non-price requirements when they are “economically dependent” on major retailers as their key 
customers.  In this situation, failure to concede to the retailer’s demands may result in a significant loss of 
trade for the supplier that cannot easily be made up through other contracts and which would then 
undermine the economic viability of the supplier. Moreover, the share of purchases taken by the retailer 
may not necessarily have to be very high for the buyer to exercise substantial bargaining leverage – since 
even a small loss of sales for the supplier can affect its viability, especially when economies of scale are 
vital to the profitable functioning of the business.  
5.3.4 Other reasons for non-price requirements 
74. However, while a position of control by a powerful retailer over its suppliers may greatly assist in 
the imposition of vertical restraints, this is not a prerequisite for retailer-led restraints to arise.  Firstly, they 
may arise through mutual consent between broadly matched trading parties, e.g., as part of the bargaining 
process where in agreeing to a restraint a supplier gains something in return, such as financial recompense (for 
any foregone income) or perhaps a reciprocal restraint placed on the retailer (e.g. to buy other goods it 
produces).  Secondly, these restraints may be in the context of standard “custom and practice” arrangements 
that might have emerged in the industry over time, e.g. being used by most or all retailers, perhaps to ensure an 
even playing field and ensure no discrimination between competing retailers. Thirdly, the restraints may arise 
in the context of a retailer facilitating a suppliers’ cartel, for example supporting a conspiracy of producers to 
prevent a price collapse through, say, agreements on resale price maintenance or on exclusive supply.   
Fourthly, such restraints may be associated with a group of retailers acting in unison, for example seeking to 
thwart a more efficient retail operation from capturing their customers (e.g. store-based “bricks-and-mortar” 
retailers seeking to deny suppliers to an online retailer).  For the most part, though, the kind of retailer-led 
vertical restraints that might be expected to occur most commonly are those in which the retailer holds some 
bargaining advantage over suppliers that ensures their compliance or consent.  
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5.3.5 Classification of different types of retailer-led restraints 
75. These practices can be wide-ranging and quite diverse in nature.  One way of viewing them is to 
consider how they affect the behaviour of trading parties and impact on competitors.  With this perspective 
in mind, Table 6 provides a simple classification (in no particular order) of different types of retailer-led 
restraints, providing examples for each of the six suggested categories.
36
 
Table 7. Types of Retailer-led Vertical Restraints 
Category Nature Examples 
1. Conditional 
Purchase 
Requirements 
Supplier required to provide significant concessions in 
respect of whom else it may trade or what it (uniquely) 
provides the retailer as a condition of purchase 
Insistence on exclusive supply 
Minimum supply obligations 
Exclusive distribution 
Reciprocal dealing 
Tying purchases  
2. Additional 
Payment 
Requirements 
Supplier required to provide lump-sum payments or 
special discounts for gaining/retaining access to a key 
distribution system or to ensure that the retailer is 
rewarded for its efforts and compensated for any 
failings on the part of the supplier 
Listing fees 
Slotting allowances 
Retroactive (overriding) discounts 
Joint marketing contributions 
One-off requested payments 
3. Non-
Discrimination 
Clauses 
Requirements placed on a supplier either to ensure 
that it does not offer (significantly) better terms or 
products to other purchasers or to assist in helping the 
purchaser compete on effective terms against other 
purchasers  
Most favoured customer clause 
Requirement to match service quality  
Margin support guarantee 
Open book accounting requirement 
4. Refusal 
to Buy 
Purchaser boycotts a supplier or limits its purchases in 
such a way as to weaken its competitive position or 
put it out of business (potentially distorting supplier 
competition and perhaps raising other retailers’ buying 
costs) 
Refusal to initiate trading 
Terminating long-standing trading 
relationship at short notice 
Delisting certain products 
5. Deliberate 
Risk Shifting 
Retailer pushes on to its supplier the financial risk that 
it faces from uncertainty over its own performance and 
realised demand in its downstream markets 
Delayed payments 
Enforced sale-or-return 
Product wastage payments 
No written contracts 
6. Service 
or Input 
Requirements 
As part of the terms and conditions of supply, the 
retailer requires a supplier to provide particular 
services or to use particular inputs (beyond those 
normally offered) to suit its own specific needs 
Tailored delivery terms 
Customised product presentation 
Obligations to use third-party contractors 
Category management services 
 
5.4 Economic Welfare Effects of Retail-led Vertical Restrains 
5.4.1 Different possible economic effects 
76. The kinds of retailer-led restraints illustrated in Table 6 may be employed simply as a means to 
allow the retailer to extract additional surplus (through non-price terms over and above straightforward 
price discounts) from suppliers and have a broadly neutral effect through a simple transfer of wealth 
(essentially a different division of the same profit pie).  However, as the arrangements by their nature act to 
restrict or influence supplier behaviour then there is the possibility that their economic effect may extend 
beyond a simple wealth transfer and they could directly or indirectly affect the nature of competition in 
supplier markets.  These terms may also affect competition in the retail markets, notably when retailer 
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 The table and examples are adapted from Dobson (2008), where there is a detailed discussion. 
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buyer power can be used as a means to reinforce retailer seller power (and perhaps vice versa).  Moreover, 
while the effects may directly fall on the firms competing at either of these vertical levels, the knock-on 
consequences for consumers from restraints that serve to prevent, restrict and/or distort competition may 
take the form of an adverse impact on prices, choice, quality, or innovation.  In other words, retailer-led 
vertical restraints can have the capacity to generate or extend market power to the detriment of consumers.  
Nevertheless, it has to be borne in mind that they might also offer significant economic benefits through 
enhancing efficiency, improving quality, and allowing for innovation.  
5.4.2 Beneficial Effects 
77. The European Commission’s 2010 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints provides a useful classification 
of the efficiency benefits that can arise from vertical restraints, dividing them into nine classes:
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1. solving a free-rider problem – e.g. a distributor free-riding on the promotion efforts of another 
distributor or a supplier free-riding on the investments of a rival supplier in a retailer which might 
be avoided by using non-compete obligations (e.g. exclusive supply/distribution); 
2. facilitating new entry into markets – e.g. a retailer requiring innovative private label ranges might 
offer exclusive supply to encourage a supplier to make necessary product investments; 
3. certification of free-rider problems – e.g. a high-quality retailer using its reputation and expertise 
to sell and promote a brand might need exclusive/selective distribution to stop other retailers 
(such as “discounters”) free-riding on its reputation resulting in under-investment; 
4. avoiding a hold-up problem – e.g. where a retailer is required to incur relationship-specific 
investments to sell a specific brand that has no other use and so might require the assurance of 
exclusive distribution or supply guarantees to ensure its investments are not undermined;   
5. avoiding a hold-up problem on the transfer of know-how – e.g. where a retailer undertakes 
substantial market research on the best means to sell a brand but requires a non-compete 
obligation to the brand supplier sharing that know-how with its other retailers; 
6. tackling vertical externality issues – e.g. where a retailer’s own effort to increase sales by cutting 
prices or increasing promotional effort increases profits for the supplier (i.e. provides a positive 
externality for a given contract and set wholesale price) but which in turn dampens the retailer’s 
incentive to provide this effort, resulting in sub-optimal sales when retail prices are set too high 
or promotional effort too low from their joint perspective, which can be respectively avoided 
with resale price maintenance and co-funded promotions; 
7. achieving economies of scale in distribution or production – e.g. where a retailer restricts the 
number of its suppliers to allow them to reap economies of scale but with the requirement for 
them to pass on cost savings to the retailer with discounts or lump sum payments; 
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  See European Commission (2010).  The EC Guidelines largely focuses attention on consideration of 
producer-led restraints, but there is consideration of some types of retailer-led restraints, notably on upfront 
access payments (like shelf-space fees, slotting allowances, and listing fees) and also category management 
agreements (and particularly the role of category captains as information facilitators). 
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8. alleviating capital market imperfections –  e.g. where banks and equity markets providing capital 
might do so sub-optimally when they lack the industry insight which trading parties possess, so 
that a retailer might be prepared instead to invest or provide loans to a private label supplier but 
conditional on exclusive supply or quantity forcing placed on the supplier; 
9. allowing for uniformity and quality standardization – e.g. a retailer requires a private label 
producer to follow quality and service standards as well as meet product/packaging design 
requirements that fit and support the retailer’s brand image and provide reassurance for 
consumers over product/service standards and so encourages them to make purchases. 
5.4.3 Efficiency benefits in combination 
78. Often vertical restraints employed retailers can serve joint or multiple purposes.  For instance, 
exclusive supply might be enforced to prevent rival retailers free riding on investments made by a retailer 
in developing new sources of supply or new product lines, while at the same time encouraging relation-
specific investment by the supplier and perhaps financial support by the retailer (e.g. a loan when 
otherwise raising capital for the supplier might be difficult).  Reciprocal dealing or tying purchases might 
be a means to access a new market as well as providing closer ties to avoid vertical externality issues.  
Customised product presentation (e.g., in the form of packaging) might be required by a retailer to 
facilitate a promotional strategy in its retail markets but also a means to support its high quality and 
distinctive reputation.  Requiring suppliers to use third-party contractors such as for product presentation 
(e.g., labelling a product supplied to a retailer) might be required to aid uniformity of the retailer’s brand 
image, while a similar requirement for trucking might allow for economies of scale in distribution. 
5.4.4 Aligning incentives and reducing costs 
79. More generally, these and other efficiency benefits typically arise from aligning trading parties’ 
incentives and/or reducing transaction/exchange costs which may afford lower final prices and improved 
product/service quality to the benefit of the ultimate consumers.  Some of these effects can be derived 
directly (e.g. improved service quality as a result of imposed service requirements; and reduced transaction 
costs by deliberately limiting the supply base to reduce negotiating, handling, and invoicing costs whilst 
also allowing for more effective monitoring of supplier performance).  Others may arise by altering 
incentives (e.g. in retailing, over-riding discounts may provide a financial reward for increased selling 
effort on the part of retailer, sale-or-return contracts may encourage the retailer to experiment with new 
goods, and contributions towards marketing costs may encourage retailer promotion effort).  
80. However, for efficiency arguments to have a material bearing on the assessment of an individual 
restraint (especially where there is a noticeable restriction on competition) it should be the case that the 
purported benefits flow directly from the restraint and that the restraint serves an important role in 
achieving such benefits (i.e. they would not otherwise likely be attainable to the same degree or with the 
same efficiency).  
5.4.5 Harmful Effects 
81. In regard to the potential negative welfare effects, the three key anticompetitive effects that may 
arise are commonly expressed as: 
1. foreclosure of other suppliers or other buyers by raising barriers to entry; 
2. softening of competition amongst suppliers or facilitation of collusion amongst these suppliers, e.g. 
resulting in a reduction of inter-brand competition between brand suppliers operating on a market; 
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3. softening of competition amongst buyers or facilitation of collusion amongst these buyers, e.g. 
resulting in a reduction of intra-brand competition between distributors of the same brand.  
5.4.6 Impact on inter-type and intra-type competition 
82. While this representation of the negative effects is common, the specific wording relates most 
directly to producer-led restraints in promoting and selling a brand.  Clearly, in the context of retailer-led 
restraints, it makes better sense to express and relate anticompetitive effects directly to the precise level of 
the supply chain affected, e.g. where competition is prevented, restricted, or distorted at the producer level 
or the retailer level, so perhaps better phrased as inter-type and intra-type competition, rather than merely 
considering effects purely in terms of inter-brand and intra-brand competition.   
5.4.7 Subtle competition distortion 
83. More pointedly, there is a need to consider separately the effects on competition at the different 
levels in the supply chain at which the supplier and retailer operate (taking account of the relevant 
economic market in each instance).  Sometimes, competition can be affected in a very direct manner – such 
as where restraints are used to foreclose markets through naked exclusion by a dominant retailer or used as 
a means to facilitate collusion.  Often, though, the effects can be subtler, through distorting competition 
rather than blatant foreclosure.  Moreover, when the retailer uses a combination of restraints or the 
restraints occur in a network of retailers, then there may be a cumulative effect (with one distorting effect 
reinforcing or building on another).  
5.4.8 Impact on choice, quality and innovation 
84. Consumers may feel the impact of these restraints when they serve to reduce or inhibit product 
choice, quality and innovation either as a direct consequence of the restraints (through foreclosure effects) 
or more indirectly when supplier competition is distorted resulting in less intense product competition 
and/or under-investment.  Consumers may also face higher prices when the restraints operate in a manner 
that serves to consolidate supplier and buyer positions, thereby reducing the number of effective 
competitors at each level of the supply chain, giving rise to the possibility of successive or coalescing 
power emerging.   For instance, in the context of retailing, suppliers may improve the terms and conditions 
afforded to major retailers while reducing them to smaller retailers – giving rise to the possibility of a 
“waterbed effect” as discussed in the previous section where distorted retail competition leads to dampened 
rivalry and ultimately higher prices for consumers.  
5.4.9 Distorting supplier competition 
85. Yet, often the most pronounced effect of retailer-led restraints is on upstream competition 
without any immediate impact on consumers.  For instance, a restraint may reduce producer welfare but 
may not have a direct or immediate effect on consumers, perhaps only becoming apparent over a long time 
period when supplier under-investment or distortions to supplier competition result in reduced product 
quality and/or variety.  This can make building an effective case against such practices difficult if 
legislation or case law relies on a consumer welfare standard rather than a total welfare standard.  Also, at 
least in the short-term, the exercise of retail buyer power may benefit consumers by reduced retail prices 
(when cost savings are at least partly passed on), making it difficult to rely on arguments relating to future 
(and thus inherently less certain) detrimental effects, such as anticipated loss of retail variety and/or 
product variety/quality. 
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5.4.10 Combination of retailer buyer and seller power 
86. Even so, a further reason for emphasising consideration of the impact of retailer-led restraints in 
is that retailer buyer power often goes together with retailer seller power, with the exercise of one offering 
the prospect of reinforcing the other, and vice versa. The concern then is whether a waterbed effect is in 
operation, which drives consolidation and reduces choice for consumers if it drives small retailers to exit 
the market and generally dampens retail competition.  In terms of economic welfare, the operation of a 
virtuous circle of reinforcing growth may not necessarily be bad from society’s perspective if it allows 
major retailers to derive increased efficiency from scale, scope, span and other economies while allowing 
for healthy competition between them to continue.  From a consumer welfare perspective this should not 
mean that consumers just gain in terms of lower prices, but that they should continue to benefit from easy 
access to and a wide choice of both products and retail formats/styles.  Nevertheless, if the effects of such 
restraints are to exacerbate differences in competitive positions in retail markets, making them more 
asymmetric over time, then it is not just access and choice that may suffer, but prices may rise as well as 
competitive intensity declines. 
5.4.11 Overall assessment of net effects on competition 
87. As with other classes of vertical restraints, economics has identified that retailer-led vertical 
restraints can offer both efficiency benefits and anticompetitive effects.  This points to the need for to 
apply a general rule-of-reason approach for consideration of these restraints.  Economic analysis points to 
the main competition concerns with retailer-led restraints arising when one or both sides of the 
procurement market are concentrated and/or dominated by one or a few major players.  In such 
circumstances, retailer-led vertical restraints may be a particular concern when they serve to foreclose 
markets (by directly reducing consumers’ choice of products and/or distribution services) or lessen price 
competition (either by facilitating collusion or strategically dampening competition).  Even so, existing 
work in this field remains quite fragmented, despite market enquiries, and certainly further theoretical and 
empirical contributions would be welcome to build up a more complete picture of the circumstances where 
anticompetitive effects are likely to dominate efficiency benefits, and vice versa.  
5.4.12 Competitive assessments in practice 
88. However, there have been a number of important investigations of retailer-led restraints, most 
notably in the retailer grocery sector.  In particular, the UK Competition Commission has undertaken two 
full markets enquiries and identified a multitude of different retailer-led restraints in operation, and as a 
consequence a government-backed industry code of practice has been set up and is overseen by an 
adjudicator to ensure there are no anti-competitive abuses of retailer buyer power and unfair trade practices 
(like delaying payments to suppliers without good cause).  Similarly, Australia has adopted a code of 
practice designed to ensure fair and equitable trading practices among industry participants.  More tailored 
actions have also been undertaken in other countries where specific abuses of retailer buyer power were 
found, such as in Japan, Germany, Hungary and Bulgaria. There have also been a number of other market 
investigations in other countries, including Finland, the Netherlands, Austria, Hungary and Romania, 
amongst others.  Thus, there is a growing body of studies and cases on which to draw for insights for 
investigating retail buyer power.
38
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 For further details and a summary of all these investigations and cases in a range of countries, see Kobel et 
al. (2015).  Also, see UNCTAD (2014).  
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6.  How can regulation work to promote rather than impede effective competition in retailing? 
6.1 Motives for business regulation 
89. Regulation of business activity is an important element of government policy to ensure the 
efficient functioning of economic markets, promote economic growth and prosperity, ensure that 
consumers benefit from and share in the rewards of economic advancements, ensure that workers and 
employees are treated fairly, and support wider social and economic goals.  However, the manner in which 
business regulation operates can provide benefits in one or more dimensions but carries with it the risk of 
acting detrimentally in other dimensions.  This is a particular concern when regulation serves to protect the 
vested interests of one economic group at the expense of another group to the extent that overall economic 
and social welfare is not well served.  For instance, incumbent firms can benefit from protectionist policies 
and regulation which restrict or limit competition, but this can serve against consumers and economic 
welfare when it impedes new entry, curtails innovation and obliges consumers to buy goods and services at 
inflated prices and/or of lesser quality than they would do otherwise.  Ideally, well-designed policy will 
avoid protectionist regulation that serves restrict, distort or prevent effective competition.  
6.2 Consumer protection and rights 
90. Retailing, as a key economic sector and one that directly faces and serves consumers, is typically 
subject to a wide range of different forms and types of regulation with different objectives.  Much of the 
regulation of retailing activity relates to consumer protection and consumer rights.  For example, there 
might be legal measures overseen by regulators to ensure that the quality of goods sold are of satisfactory 
quality (including food safety measures), fit for all intended purposes, and as described when sold, as well 
as providing consumers with rights on seeking refunds or other compensation where the retailer supplies 
faulty goods.  Equally, there can be regulations in the way that goods are promoted and sold to consumers, 
to prevent consumers being misled on prices or product quality through how these aspects are advertised 
and promoted.   To the extent that these measures provide assurance and encouragement to consumers to 
purchase goods, then consumer protection regulation can promote competition and economic welfare by 
supporting and enabling consumers to make well-informed purchasing decisions.
39
  Indeed, well-designed 
consumer policy can act as an important complement to well-designed competition policy to assist in the 
effective functioning of retail markets and promotion of economic welfare. 
6.3 Regulations which can potentially impede effective competition 
91. There are, though, other types of regulation of retail activity that have the potential to impede 
effective competition and so need to be considered very carefully in their design to ensure that economic 
benefits outweigh economic costs.  These include: 
 Foreign direct investment (FDI) and foreign ownership restrictions – these can protect incumbent 
national retailers and ensure that retail ownership remains in the country but this can be at the 
expense of retail markets not having access to innovative and efficient international retailers that 
could spur domestic competition and bring greater choice and other benefits for consumers. 
 Planning, zoning and licensing restrictions – these can protect incumbent retailers that already 
have established retail outlets and prevent retail sprawl if seen as an environmental concern but 
this can be at the expense of preventing the entry new retailers and diffusion of new retail 
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 As an illustration, the UK’s Competition and Markets Authority (2015b) undertook a detailed empirical 
investigation of the extent to which UK supermarkets might be employing misleading and deceptive price 
promotions in the wake of a complaint from a consumers association.  
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formats, such as when planning restrictions restrict the location and size of “big box” superstores 
and hypermarkets or other modern forms of retailing.
40
 
 Opening hours restrictions – these can protect workers’ rights on the number of hours worked but if 
applied differently for different retailers (e.g. tighter restrictions for large format retailers than smaller 
traditional retailers) can distort competition and restrict consumer choice and shopping convenience.
41
 
 Price controls and restrictions on price discounting – fixed retail prices can ensure that consumers 
face common prices wherever they shop and restrictions on discounting (e.g. preventing below-cost 
selling) can encourage competition on non-price aspects (like service and quality) but can protect 
inefficient retailers, discourage efficiency improvements, and lead to higher prices for consumers.
42
 
 Economic dependency laws and supplier protection regulations – while preventing abuses of 
retail buyer power and can encourage suppliers to make appropriate investments for improving 
efficiency and also help maintain product choice for consumers, measures which restrict how 
hard retailers can negotiate with their suppliers and the demands made upon them to give good 
terms of supply can potentially soften supplier competition and lead to higher supply prices 
obtained by retailers which feed through to higher retail prices to the detriment of consumers.
43
 
6.4 Making markets work well for consumers 
92. Ultimately the test for regulations should be to see how well they allow markets to work for the 
benefit of consumers and the general public.  This is rarely an easy empirical task for authorities in the 
absence of good natural experiments providing contrasting economic and regulatory conditions to make 
comparisons and allow for consideration of credible counterfactual situations.  Also, there is the political 
dimension given that regulations can often bestow considerable benefits for some parties but be to the 
detriment of others, such that once regulations become established then they can be difficult to remove or 
amend.  Accordingly, designing regulations well in advance of their implementation can be vitally 
important to ensure the markets work well and continue to do so in the future as well.   There is much that 
can be learned from studying the experience of how regulation has worked in other jurisdictions, yet 
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 There have been a number of studies examining the impact of planning and zoning regulations for a range 
of countries including Uruguay (Borraz et al. 2014), Australia (ACCC 2008; Australian Government 
2011); the UK (CC 2000; CC 2008; Haskel and Sadun 2012), France (Bertrand and Kramerz 2002), and 
Italy (Schivardi and Viviano 2011).  Tight planning restrictions and licensing regimes run the risk of 
impeding new retail entry which can act as an important stimulus to competition and prevent markets 
ossifying.  On the scale of benefits that new retail entry can bring to consumers, see Hausman and Leibtag 
(2007), Jia (2008) and Basker and Noel (2009). 
41
  For example, see Boylaud and Nicoletti (2001).  For a review and multi-country study, looking at the 
impact of relaxing Sunday trading across 30 European countries, see Genakos and Danchev (2015). 
42 
  For example, Biscourp et al. (2013) examine the impact of the Loi Galland in France which prevented 
below-cost selling and show how its inflationary effect on raising prices and stifling competition.  
Similarly, evidence indicates that the rescinding of the Irish Groceries Order preventing below-cost selling 
also led to a general fall in retail prices and greater retail competition amongst supermarkets in Ireland – 
see Collins and Burt (2011). 
43 
 For details on countries which use regulations to protect suppliers, see the summary international report in 
Kobel et al. (2014).  This is an area where different countries adopted different policies and it is not yet 
evident as to which policy represents best practice given the difficult balancing act required between 
preventing anti-competitive abuses of retailer buyer power but still allowing for and encouraging effective 
competition and bargaining within retail supply chains.  For a discussion on policy and regulatory options 
for tackling anti-competitive and abusive retail buyer power, see Dobson (2002) and UNCTAD (2014). 
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unintended consequences are almost inevitable with the operation of even seemingly well-designed 
business regulation when the behaviour and responses of different economic agents cannot be guaranteed 
or taken for granted.
44
   
7. Summary and Conclusion 
7.1 Economic importance of effective competition in retailing 
93. The retail sector is a key component of any modern economy.  As the interface and medium by 
which consumers buy most goods, retailing is a sector which serves and affects the whole population.  
However, retailing is much more than a distribution function and conduit by which producers reach final 
consumers.  Retailing in its own right adds economic value through the service it provides to consumers, in 
stimulating demand and coordinating the supply of vast ranges of products sold in retail outlets with 
products typically sourced from across the world.  Yet, retailing is also a sector that is developing rapidly, 
with the emergence of very substantial national and international chain-store operators, often with new, 
innovative store formats which spur competition and enhance choice for consumers.  At the same time, the 
emergence of these large retail businesses challenge the existing traditional base of retailing, historically 
made up of small independent retailers.  In some countries, the result has been that traditional retailing has 
declined sharply, but in other countries it remains important and thriving.  Yet, for all countries, how the 
retail sector develops in the coming years can have a major impact on consumers and spur to economic 
prosperity, and it is important for the sector to be highly competitive for the sake of ensuring that 
consumers benefit from low prices, availability of high quality products, a wide choice and assortment of 
products, and accessibility to a good range and variety of stores.  
7.2 Concerns about increasing retail concentration 
94. While the battle between different retail forms and retail formats striving for supremacy is 
encouraging for consumers as a stimulus to competition, there is nonetheless concern that increasing 
concentration in retail markets can result in less vigorous competition and increase the scope for anti-
competitive practices to operate to the detriment of consumers.  This is particularly the concern with 
mergers amongst already large retailers which can considerably increase market concentration and reduce 
direct the amount head-to-head competition.  While there might be efficiency benefits from such mergers, 
so allowing merged parties to lower their costs, there will nonetheless be concern about anti-competitive 
unilateral effects from the increased market power of the merged parties and/or coordinated effects arising 
amongst the remaining rivals after the conclusion of mergers.  In such circumstances, competition 
assessment requires analysing the balance of efficiency and market power effects to determine the net 
outcome of such mergers.  In this regard, it is important not just to focus on “price” as the most easily 
measurable element of retailers’ proposition, because in addition consideration needs to be given to the 
other aspects of the P-Q-R-S retail proposition, i.e. “quality”, “range” and “service”, while taking account 
of consumer behaviour and preferences.   This requires competition authorities to have a good 
understanding of consumers and their behaviour – something which might require surveys on consumers’ 
preferences or careful analysis of sales data to identify shopping behaviour and consumers’ willingness to 
shop around and substitute between different retailers and different store formats.  
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 For a wide ranging discussion with numerous examples and vignettes, see OFT (2009) which provides a 
guide setting out the rationale for government intervention in markets and demonstrates that for these 
interventions to be effective in the long term, their impact on competition needs to be a central 
consideration. 
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7.3 Market definition assessment 
95. Understanding consumers’ shopping behaviour and preferences is also a vital element for 
defining relevant retail markets.  Which retailers do consumers view as substitutes? Do large supermarkets 
and small/specialist food retailers cater for the same shopping needs and so can be viewed as being in the 
same market?  Do consumers differentiate by store format (big box vs. small stores), the nature of the 
shopping trip (superstore one-stop shopping vs. convenience-store top-up shopping), the quality/range on 
offer (full service supermarkets vs. limited assortment discounters), and type of foods (general 
supermarkets vs. specialist wholefoods/organic food retailers).  If so, to what extent?  How tightly are 
different types of retailers constrained by the behaviour of other types of retailers in terms of adjusting 
their retail proposition (e.g. in their ability to raise prices and/or reduce quality, range or service)? Do they 
compete asymmetrically, so one type constrains another type but not the other way around?  Similarly, in 
respect of the geographic scope of retail markets, how far or for how long are consumers willing to travel 
to visit different stores to serve their specific shopping needs and shop around for the best deals?  To what 
extent does that physical distance or travel time vary according to the nature of shopping expedition?  Do 
retailers operating across different locations have the capability or flexibility (even if not exercised) to alter 
their retail proposition at the local level?   
7.4 Merger analysis 
96. Defining markets is important in assessing the economic effects of retail mergers.  While 
sophisticated quantitative techniques, like Upward Pricing Pressure (UPP) and demand-estimated merger 
simulation techniques promise to provide a sophisticated and nuanced assessment of the complex 
interaction of product and geographic markets without the need of market definition, they nonetheless have 
their limitations.
45
  They require data, expert staff and time to be properly applied but more importantly are 
limited by their emphasis on price to the exclusion of other elements of the retail proposition that could 
matter considerably to consumers.  More tellingly, these techniques tend to emphasise incremental, linear 
changes in behaviour and outcomes when in fact a merger might fundamentally alter the industry dynamic 
in distinctly non-linear ways (such as a move from price setting shifting from an antagonistic, highly 
competitive form to a soft, coordinated form).  Accordingly, it makes sense in retail merger assessment to 
undertake general qualitative as well as an array of different quantitative analyses to serve as a rounded 
guide in determining the likely effects to result from the concentration and understand how retail markets 
are likely to evolve post-merger.  Moreover, taking a broad perspective is important in considering the full 
breadth of possible merger remedies, especially involving structural aspects.  Here, store divestment 
requirements have become increasingly used by competition authorities, and these might effectively tackle 
local competition concerns.  Nevertheless, limited store divestments might not be sufficient to allay 
concerns about broader unilateral or coordinated effects or indeed how the merger impacts on procurement 
markets, which might only be resolvable through blocking the entire merger in the absence of sufficient 
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  Farrell and Shapiro (2010) argue the case for using “upward pricing pressure” techniques for screening 
mergers instead of using market definition and market share analysis. On some of the practical challenges, 
see Schmalensee (2009), Sørgard (2012), and Wiethaus and Nitsche (2015).  In respect of merger 
simulation analysis, an important aspect affecting the scale of predicted increases in post-merger prices is 
the choice of demand functional form (and specifically its curvature), so it has to be selected and used with 
care; see Shapiro (1996) and Crooke et al. (1999).  The last few years has witnessed authorities employing 
a variety of different measures including IPP (illustrative price rise), UPP (upward pricing pressure), 
GUPPI (gross upward pricing pressure index), PPI (pricing pressure index), and CMCR compensating 
marginal cost reduction, all attempting to reflect that a merger can raise prices unless there are 
compensating efficiency benefits.  For retail merger applications, see the views of OFT/CC (2011) and 
observations by RBB Economics (2011) and OXERA (2013).  The approach adopted in Canada is 
summarised at http://www.competitionbureau.gc.ca/eic/site/cb-bc.nsf/eng/03796.html. 
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alternative structural or behavioural remedies.   Completely blocking a retail merger might appear drastic 
but it might be the only way to ensure that the relevant retail markets remain competitive in some cases. 
7.5 Regulation and intervention 
97. The risk of a retail merger having adverse effects on competition are, though, enhanced if 
regulation and institutional measures create or enhance entry barriers or otherwise stifle competition. Even 
highly concentrated retail markets can demonstrate vigorous effective competition so long as the market 
conditions are conducive to intense, transparent competitive interaction.  Active consumers, willing to shop 
around and search for the best deals, are a key component to ensuring that retail competition remains keen.  
However, any obstacles put in their way, or equally put in the way of retailers developing new ways of 
satisfying their needs, are likely to impede competition.  Accordingly, competition authorities need to be 
vigilant and aware not just of anti-competitive practices and competition avoidance that retail firms might 
take on their own accord, but also ensure that regulation and policy intervention measures do not inhibit 
competition and insulate competitors rather than protect and promote competition and so make retail 
markets work well for consumers.  
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